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Articles
On the Perils of Line-Drawing: Juveniles
and the Death Penalty
by
JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN*
The use of the death penalty against juveniles is by no means a re-
cent phenomenon in the United States.I It has always been a rare prac-
tice, however,2 and its constitutional validity has come under increasing
attack in the past several years. Within the past ten years, the Supreme
Court has been presented with numerous petitions for certiorari alleging
that imposing the death penalty against murderers who were juveniles
when they committed their crimes violates the eighth amendment's ban
* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington. B.A. 1978, Harvard
College; J.D. 1984, University of Washington. The author clerked for Judge Phyllis A.
Kravitch of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit from 1984 to 1985,
and for then-Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist of the United States Supreme Court dur-
ing the 1985-86 Term.
The author assumes, for purposes of this Article, that the abolition of the death penalty
itself is not at issue. Although some of the arguments presented in this Article could be used
to support the abolition of the death penalty, the author believes that scholarship in the death
penalty area need not, and should not, focus solely on the abolition question. Instead, the
author believes, scholarship addressing other death penalty issues can help to improve the
administration of the death penalty, pending political or legal resolution of the abolition
question.
The author would like to thank David Baldus, Craig Bradley, Daniel Conkle, Richard
Fraher, William Popkin, Lauren Robel, Michael Sinclair, Victor Streib, William Stuntz, Scott
Sundby, Lloyd Weinreb, and Robert Weisberg for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of
this Article. The author remains solely responsible for the ideas expressed and any errors
contained in the Article.
1. The first recorded case involved a 16-year-old named Thomas Graunger, who was
executed in the Plymouth Colony in 1642 for committing the crime of bestiality. See N. TEET-
ERS & J. HEDBLOM, "HANG BY THE NECK" 111 (1967).
2. Professor Victor Streib, in his recently published comprehensive study of the juvenile
death penalty, has calculated that the largest number of executions of juveniles in the United
States during any decade since 1890 was the 53 such executions that took place during the
1940s. Overall, between 1890 and 1986, only 210 juveniles were executed in the United States,
representing merely 2.5% of the total number of executions. V. STREIB, DEATH PENALTY
FOR JUVENILES 25 (1987).
[229]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
on cruel and unusual punishment.3 The Court has granted certiorari in
six such cases, 4 but to date either has failed to reach the juvenile death
penalty issue at all5 or, as in the most recently argued case, has failed to
produce a majority opinion on the subject. 6 Three such cases await deci-
sion during the Court's 1988 Term.7
The proponents and opponents of a constitutional ban on the use of
the death penalty against juveniles have advanced several arguments to
support their respective positions. Among the arguments for a ban are:
(1) Our society, as represented by our legislatures, prosecutors, judges,
and juries, has rejected the juvenile death penalty;8 (2) other nations, in-
cluding many that share our Anglo-American heritage, have rejected the
juvenile death penalty; 9 (3) the threat of the death penalty does not deter
potential juvenile murderers, because juveniles often do not consider the
possible consequences prior to committing their murderous acts and be-
cause, even if they did consider these consequences, they would realize
that very few juveniles actually receive the death penalty; 10 (4) juveniles
are especially likely to be rehabilitated or reformed while in prison, thus
rendering the juvenile death penalty especially inappropriate;" and (5)
the juvenile death penalty does not serve a legitimate retributive purpose,
since juveniles are generally less mature and responsible than adults, and
should therefore be viewed as less culpable than adults who commit the
3. See, e.g., Roach v. Martin, 757 F.2d 1463 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1039
(1986); Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387, 478 A.2d 1143 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230
(1985); Cannaday v. State, 455 So. 2d 713 (Miss. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1221 (1985);
Tokman v. State, 435 So. 2d 664 (Miss. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256 (1984).
4. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104
(1982); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978); High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988 (11 th Cir. 1987), cert.
granted sub nom. High v. Zant, 56 U.S.L.W. 3894 (U.S. June 30, 1988) (No. 87-5666); Stan-
ford v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 781 (Ky. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. Stanford v. Ken-
tucky, 57 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1988) (No. 87-5765), as amended, 57 U.S.L.W. 3280
(U.S. Oct. 18, 1988) (No. 87-5765); State v. Wilkins, 736 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. 1987), cert. granted
sub nom. Wilkins v. Missouri, 56 U.S.L.W. 3894 (U.S. June 30, 1988) (No. 87-6026).
5. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 116; Bell, 438 U.S. at 642 n.* (plurality opinion) (Burger,
C.J.).
6. See Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2689 (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J.).
7. High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988 (1 1th Cir. 1987), cert. grantedsub nom. High v. Zant, 56
U.S.L.W. 3894 (U.S. June 30, 1988) (No. 87-5666); Stanford v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d
781 (Ky. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. Stanford v. Kentucky, 57 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Oct. 11,
1988) (No. 87-5765), as amended, 57 U.S.L.W. 3280 (U.S. Oct. 18, 1988) (No. 87-5765); State
v. Wilkins, 736 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. Wilkins v. Missouri, 56
U.S.L.W. 3894 (U.S. June 30, 1988) (No. 87-6026).
8. See Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2692-98.
9. See id. at 2696 & n.34.
10. See id. at 2700; V. STREIB, supra note 2, at 188.
11. See V. STREIB, supra note 2, at 188.
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same crimes. 12 To bolster the view that juveniles are sufficiently different
from adults to warrant special constitutional treatment, advocates of a
ban have pointed to the existence of special laws relating to juveniles in
such areas as driving, 13 voting,14 gambling,' 5 marriage,16 and jury
service.' 7
Among the arguments against a constitutional ban on the death pen-
alty for juveniles are: (1) The evidence of a societal consensus against the
juvenile death penalty is nonexistent, or at least too weak to justify a
constitutional ban;' 8 (2) the views of other nations are irrelevant to the
proper interpretation of our Constitution, at least absent a consensus
within our own society;19 (3) the threat of the death penalty can deter
potential juvenile murderers, or at least the judgments of legislatures and
prosecutors to that effect deserve deference; 20 (4) the most heinous juve-
nile murderers, who are the only ones likely to receive the death penalty,
are not good candidates for rehabilitation or reform;2' and (5) there are
some juvenile murderers who are sufficiently mature and responsible to
12. See Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2698-99; V. STRE, supra note 2, at 188.
13. In Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2702 app. C (Stevens, 1.), the plurality noted that "[m]ost
States have various provisions regulating driving age, from learner's permits through driver's
licenses. In all States but one, 15-year-olds either may not drive, or may drive only with
parental consent or accompaniment." The one exception is Montana, which permits 15-year-
olds to drive without parental consent upon completion of a driver's education course. See
MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-5-105 (1987).
14. The twenty-sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees to 18-
year-olds the right to vote. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. All 50 states and the District of
Columbia provide for an 18-year-old voting age. See Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2701 app. A.
15. In Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2705 app. F, the plurality noted that, in 39 of the 48 states
in which some form of gambling is legal, "minors are absolutely prohibited from participating
in some or all forms of such gambling." The remaining nine states either permit parental
consent to vitiate the prohibition, see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 995.13 (West 1983); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 305 (Purdon Supp. 1988); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 179d, § 17
(Vernon Supp. 1988), or, as in Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Caro-
lina, and Virginia, express no minimum age within their gambling statutes.
16. For example, fifteen-year-olds are permitted to marry without parental consent,
under certain circumstances, in only four states. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.171 (1983); LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 87 (West Supp. 1988); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-301 (1984);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-5(d) (Supp. 1987).
17. In Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2701 app. B, the plurality noted that "[i]n no State may
anyone below the age of 18 serve on a jury."
18. See Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2714-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19. See id. at 2716 n.4.
20. Note, The Death Penalty for Juveniles-A Constitutional Alternative, 7 J. Juv. L. 54,
65-66 (1983) (authored by Carol A. Crow).
21. Id. at 56-57. See generally Feld, Juvenile Court, Legislative Reform and the Serious
Young Offender: Dismantling the "Rehabilitation Ideal," 65 MINN. L. REV. 167, 233-37
(1980) (discussing problems of dealing with sophisticated, persistent, or violent juvenile offend-
ers within rehabilitative juvenile justice system).
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deserve the death penalty for their crimes, and thus the juvenile death
penalty serves a legitimate retributive purpose.22 The opponents of a ban
generally seek to distinguish age limits in other areas of the law, arguing
that even if juveniles do not know how to vote conscientiously or how to
drive a car safely, they certainly know that it is very wrong to kill an-
other human being. 23
In this Article, I do not discuss most of the arguments mentioned
above, nor do I attempt to decide whether such arguments ultimately
"add up" to a conclusion in favor of, or against, a constitutional ban on
the death penalty for juveniles. Rather, I discuss the juvenile death pen-
alty issue solely in terms of the principles of retributive justice. In other
words, I focus exclusively on the question whether a ban on the death
penalty for juveniles is consistent with the fundamental retributive goal
of ensuring that every person who commits a crime receives his or her
"just deserts," or the punishment that is appropriate in light of the harm
caused by the crime and the offender's culpability.
This question is central to the constitutional issue presented in the
juvenile death penalty cases. According to the Supreme Court, the
eighth amendment requires that the decision whether to impose the
death penalty in a particular case be based on the defendant's "moral
culpability,"' 24 or "personal responsibility and moral guilt."'2 5 Thus, the
Court's interpretation of the eighth amendment incorporates notions of
retributive justice. Yet this question has not been considered adequately
by those involved in the debate over the constitutionality of the juvenile
death penalty.
The debate, in retributive terms, has boiled down to two competing
claims. As noted above, the advocates of a ban have argued that most
juveniles do not deserve to die for their crimes, and that a ban on the
juvenile death penalty will therefore serve the ends of justice. The oppo-
nents of a ban have argued in response, as also noted above, that at least
some juveniles deserve to die for their crimes, and that a ban will there-
fore frustrate the ends of justice. Given the concededly small number of
"death-deserving" juvenile murderers, and the inherent risk, absent a
ban, of improper exercises of capital sentencing discretion, the advocates
22. See Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2719; Ellison, State Execution of Juveniles: Defining
Youth as a Mitigating Factor for Imposing a Sentence of Less Than Death, 11 LAW & PSY-
CHOLOGY REV. 1, 36 (1987).
23. See, e.g., Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2718 n.5.
24. See Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2534 (1987).
25. See id. at 2533 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)).
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of a ban often have seemed to hold the higher ground with respect to the
issue of retributive justice.
The debate about retributive justice described above badly misses
the mark, however, because each side has relied entirely on cardinal pro-
portionality to justify its position. In this Article I demonstrate that
modem retributive theory, which properly demands both cardinal and
ordinal proportionality, compels the Court to reject a ban on the juvenile
death penalty, at least if such a ban is to be accomplished by means of a
"bright line" based on the chronological age of the murderer. Those who
advocate a ban on the juvenile death penalty may be able to base their
constitutional claim on some set of alternative values, such as utilitarian
considerations of rehabilitation or deterrence, or the symbolic value of
extending mercy to murderers who are juveniles. In retributive terms,
however, such a ban would produce serious injustice, and the advocates
of a ban must realize this when making their alternative arguments.
In terms of retributive justice, what is most troubling about a
"bright line" ban on the juvenile death penalty is not the fact that a small
number of "death-deserving" juvenile murderers would escape the death
penalty and receive life in prison or some other lengthy prison sentence.
Rather, what is most troubling, or should be, is the fact that such "death-
deserving" juvenile murderers would be treated differently from
nonjuvenile murderers whose desert was exactly the same as, or even less
than, that of the ineligible juvenile murderers, but who would neverthe-
less be eligible for and receive the death penalty. And the sole basis for
this life-versus-death difference in punishment, between the nonjuvenile
murderers and the equally or more culpable juvenile murderers, would
be the chronological age of the murderer at the time of the crime.
The use of chronological age to draw a "bright line" and prohibit
the death penalty for juveniles inevitably would produce results that,
viewed in retributive justice terms, can only be described as "arbitrary" 26
and "freakish."' 27 After all, age itself is not the factor that renders the
imposition of the death penalty against most juveniles arguably unjust.
Rather, age is simply a "proxy," and an imperfect one at that, for a com-
bination of factors that determines the relative culpability of a juvenile
murderer. These factors include maturity, judgment, responsibility, and
the capability to assess the possible consequences of one's conduct. Be-
cause age only imperfectly reflects this complex combination of factors,
the adoption of a "bright line" ban on the death penalty for juveniles,
26. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 295 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
27. See id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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defined in terms of age, necessarily violates the concept of ordinal, or
comparative, proportionality, which is an important component of re-
tributive justice.28 In the end, this means that the advocates of such a
constitutional ban must demonstrate other reasons to adopt it, and these
other reasons must be important enough to outweigh the serious injustice
such a ban would produce.
In section I of this Article, I review the modem history of the juve-
nile death penalty, focusing on the Supreme Court's unsuccessful at-
tempts to resolve the question whether the eighth amendment bars the
death penalty for juveniles. In section II, I explain the significance of
and relationship between the concepts of cardinal and ordinal propor-
tionality. In particular, I argue that, although ordinal proportionality
allows us to make much more refined judgments about the "justice" of
punishments than cardinal proportionality, the two kinds of proportion-
ality are not theoretically distinct. Instead, cardinal and ordinal propor-
tionality simply involve different comparative approaches to resolving
the same issue, namely, the determination of "just" punishments. In sec-
tion III, I show the relevance of the principles of retributive justice to the
constitutional issue raised in the juvenile death penalty cases by examin-
ing how the Court already has incorporated such principles into its
eighth amendment jurisprudence. In section IV, I discuss how the prin-
ciples of retributive justice might influence the Court's analysis of the
constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty, and particularly how the
Court might remedy any comparative injustice that exists under the cur-
rent guided discretionary capital sentencing system for juveniles. In sec-
tion V, I contrast the use of "bright lines" in the context of the juvenile
death penalty with the use of such lines in other areas of death penalty
law. Finally, in section VI, I argue that the analogy, often drawn by
advocates of a ban on the juvenile death penalty, between the use of
chronological age as a "bright line" for the purpose of imposing such a
ban and the use of age as a "bright line" in other areas of the law is
inappropriate and misleading.
I. Background: The Juvenile Death Penalty
and the Constitution
A. The Early Cases: Bell v. Ohio and Eddings v. Oklahoma
During the modern death penalty era, which began with the
Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia,29 the first case in
28. See infra notes 90-156 and accompanying text.
29. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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which the Supreme Court was faced with the argument that the juvenile
death penalty violated the Constitution was Bell v. Ohio.30 In Bell, the
defendant was sixteen years old when he committed the murder for
which he received his death sentence. At the sentencing hearing, the de-
fense attorney argued that the defendant's youth should be a mitigating
factor. The Ohio death penalty statute, however, prohibited the use of
any mitigating factors, such as youth, that were not specified in the stat-
ute.31 On certiorari to the Supreme Court, Bell challenged his sentence
on several grounds, including both the procedural claim that Ohio had
wrongly prevented him from arguing his youth as a mitigating factor,
and the substantive claim that the death penalty was disproportionate as
applied to his case, presumably because of his age.32
The Court never reached Bell's substantive claim. Instead, in the
companion case of Lockett v. Ohio,33 a plurality concluded that the
eighth amendment requires the states to permit a defendant to introduce
any available evidence in mitigation of a death sentence, regardless of
whether such a mitigating factor was set forth specifically in the particu-
lar state's death penalty statute. Relying on the decision in Lockett, the
same plurality of the Court reversed Bell's sentence and remanded the
case to the Ohio courts without deciding the juvenile death penalty
issue.34
30. 438 U.S. 637 (1978).
31. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03-.04 (Anderson 1975).
32. Bell, 438 U.S. at 642 & n.* (plurality opinion) (Burger, C.J.).
33. 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (Burger, C.J.). Chief Justice Burger's
opinion in Lockett, although technically only a plurality opinion, is properly viewed as the
equivalent of a majority opinion. Justice Marshall refused to join the opinion reversing the
death sentence in Lockett on the basis of his belief, as expressed in his dissent in Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231-41 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting), that the Court should have
gone further and declared the death penalty facially unconstitutional. Lockett, 438 U.S. at
619-21 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Marshall certainly agreed, however,
that any death sentence that failed to meet the requirements set forth by the Lockett plurality
could not stand. The Chief Justice's Lockett opinion thus properly carries the weight of a
majority, rather than a plurality, opinion, and might be termed a "false" plurality opinion.
Justice Brennan, who did not participate in the decision in Lockett, 438 U.S. at 609, and
Justice Marshall refused to join several other early post-Gregg opinions reversing particular
death sentences, thus giving rise to additional "false" plurality opinions. See Godfrey v. Geor-
gia, 446 U.S. 420, 433-44 (1980) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., concurring in the judg-
ment); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment);
id. at 600-01 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,
364-65 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in the judgment); id. at 365-71
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
34. Bell, 438 U.S. at 642-43 (plurality opinion) (Burger, C.J.). Bell, like Lockett, is a
"false" plurality opinion that properly should be viewed as the equivalent of a majority opin-
ion. See supra note 33. Justice Marshall concurred only in the judgment in Bell, but certainly
agreed that the case was governed by the same rule announced by the plurality in Lockett. See
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Four years later, the Court decided the case of Eddings v.
Oklahoma.35 In Eddings, as in Bell, the defendant was sixteen when he
committed his crime; Eddings had murdered a police officer. At the sen-
tencing hearing, the defense attorney presented evidence of the defend-
ant's troubled background, including his broken home, his resulting
mental and emotional problems, and his many prior episodes of violent
behavior. This evidence was introduced pursuant to the Oklahoma death
penalty statute, which, unlike Ohio's statute, permitted the defense to
present "any mitigating circumstances. ' 36 The sentencing judge, how-
ever, apparently did not view Eddings' evidence as truly "mitigating" in
nature. The judge explained, in the course of sentencing Eddings to
death: "Nor can the Court in following the law, in my opinion, consider
the fact of this young man's violent background. '37
Eddings filed a petition for certiorari raising both procedural and
substantive challenges to his death sentence.3 8 Unlike in Bell, however,
the Court in Eddings specifically limited the grant of certiorari to the
claim that the eighth amendment prohibited the death penalty for
juveniles.39 Nevertheless, the Court again failed to reach the juvenile
death penalty issue. Instead, the Court reversed the death sentence on
the ground that the sentencing judge violated Lockett by failing to con-
sider all of the evidence presented by Eddings in mitigation.4° The Court
held, in effect, that evidence of a bad background can be just as "mitigat-
ing" as evidence of a good background, or at least that the sentencer
must conscientiously weigh both kinds of mitigating evidence before im-
posing a death sentence. Therefore, as in Bell, the Court sent the defend-
ant back to the state courts for resentencing without deciding whether
the juvenile death penalty is constitutional. 41
B. Thompson v. Oklahoma
The Court most recently revisited the juvenile death penalty issue
during the 1987 Term, when it decided Thompson v. Oklahoma.42 While
the Court finally reached the issue of the constitutionality of the juvenile
Bell, 438 U.S. at 643-44 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Brennan did not
participate in the decision in Bell. Id. at 643.
35. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
36. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10 (West 1980).
37. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 109 (citing Record app. at 189) (emphasis omitted).
38. Id. at 113 n.9.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 113.
41. Id. at 113, 117.
42. 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988).
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death penalty, it was unable to agree sufficiently on the resolution of the
issue to produce a majority opinion.
In Thompson, the defendant was only fifteen years old when he,
along with three older accomplices, murdered his former brother-in-law.
Under Oklahoma law, fifteen year olds are treated as "children" subject
to the juvenile courts rather than the adult criminal justice system, unless
a specific finding is made to the contrary.43 In order to certify a fifteen
year old to stand trial as an adult, the trial judge must find that (1) the
state has established the "prosecutive merit" of the case, and (2) there are
no reasonable prospects for rehabilitation of the "child" within the juve-
nile justice system.44 After hearing testimony from a clinical psycholo-
gist, a juvenile justice system employee, and other witnesses familiar with
Thompson's background, the trial judge entered an order certifying
Thompson to be tried as an adult.45
Thompson was convicted of first-degree murder, and a sentencing
hearing was conducted to determine the appropriateness of the death
penalty. At the sentencing hearing, the defense attorney was allowed to
argue Thompson's youth as a mitigating circumstance. Nevertheless, the
jury recommended, and the sentencing judge imposed, the death sen-
tence. Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted Thompson's petition
for a writ of certiorari with respect to both the substantive claim that the
juvenile death penalty violated the eighth amendment and a procedural
claim that the introduction at the sentencing phase of the trial of certain
gruesome photographs of the victim's body was improper.46
The Court reversed Thompson's death sentence by a five to three
vote, but failed to produce a majority opinion on the issue of the constitu-
tionality of the juvenile death penalty. The plurality opinion, written by
Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun,
concluded that the eighth amendment prohibits the death penalty for ju-
venile murderers who commit their crimes while under the age of six-
teen.47 Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment but wrote a separate
opinion.48 Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined by
43. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1101(1) (West 1987). On the general subject of "waiv-
ers" of juvenile court jurisdiction, see Note, Juvenile Offenders and the Electric Chair: Cruel
and Unusual Punishment or Firm Discipline for the Hopelessly Delinquent, 35 U. FLA. L. REv.
344, 346-58 (1983) (authored by William Wilson).
44. Ia at § 1112(b).
45. See Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2713 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
46. See id at 2691.
47. Id at 2700.
48. l at 2711 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (vacating death sentence be-
cause there was insufficent evidence that Oklahoma's legislature had carefully considered the
minimum age for death eligibility).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White.49 Justice Kennedy, who
joined the Court after the oral arguments in the case, did not participate
in the decision. 50
In concluding that imposing the death penalty on juveniles under
sixteen was unconstitutional, Justice Stevens relied upon two primary
factors: (1) An examination of societal standards, as manifested in the
laws of states and other countries and as evidenced by the behavior of
juries in deciding whether to impose the death penalty on juveniles; and
(2) principles of relative culpability, retribution, and deterrence. Justice
Stevens began by noting that eighth amendment jurisprudence requires
the Court to determine the contours of the "evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of a maturing society.151 He reviewed the
legislative judgments of the states, pointing to the fact that fourteen
states do not have a death penalty at all, while an additional eighteen
states have expressly established either sixteen, seventeen, or eighteen as
the minimum age for the death penalty. 52 This left nineteen states in
which a fifteen year old could legally receive the death penalty. 3 None-
theless, Justice Stevens placed "to one side" these latter statutes because
the legislatures in those states had "not expressly confronted the question
of establishing a minimum age for imposition of the death penalty."'54
He concluded that, based on legislative judgments, "it would offend civi-
lized standards of decency to execute a person who was less than 16 years
old at the time of his or her offense. . . -55 He bolstered this conclusion
by referring to international standards of decency as expressed by the
death penalty laws of the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and the Soviet
Union, among others.5 6
Justice Stevens next examined the attitudes of American juries. In
this context, he noted that apparently only eighteen to twenty persons
have been executed during the twentieth century for crimes committed
before the age of sixteen.57 Moreover, the last such execution took place
49. Id. at 2712 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that under some circumstances a particu-
lar juvenile may be mature enough for a state to punish his actions with death).
50. Id. at 2700.
51. Id. at 2691 (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J.) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958) (plurality opinion) (Warren, C.J.)).
52. Id. at 2694-96. The Court included the District of Columbia as a state, which ac-
counts for the survey total of 51. The District of Columbia, along with 13 other states, had
found the death penalty unconstitutional. Id. at 2694 n.25.
53. See id. at 2694-95 & n,29.
54. Id. at 2693-95.
55. Id. at 2696.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2697 & n.36 (citing V. STREIB, supra note 2, at 190-208). In his book, Profes-
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in 1948.58 In his evaluation of jury behavior, Justice Stevens cited statis-
tics showing that only five of the persons who received a death sentence
between 1982 and 1986 were younger than sixteen at the time of the
crime.59
Finally, Justice Stevens considered whether the death penalty for
fifteen-year-old murderers is appropriate in light of the relative culpabil-
ity of such murderers and the legitimate purposes of the death penalty.
He began by observing that "punishment should be directly related to the
personal culpability of the criminal defendant." 6 He explained that
"less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to
a comparable crime committed by an adult."' 61 This was so, he argued,
because juveniles are typically less experienced, less educated, less intelli-
gent, and more likely to be motivated by "mere emotion or peer pres-
sure" than adults. 62
Turning to the twin purposes of the death penalty, retribution and
deterrence, Justice Stevens reasoned that the juvenile offender's de-
creased culpability renders the retributive purpose inapplicable. 63 More-
over, the typical juvenile's lack of careful consideration of the
consequences of his actions, coupled with the small number of juveniles
executed during the twentieth century, renders the deterrence purpose
equally inapplicable."4 Justice Stevens concluded that the death penalty,
for those murderers who are under the age of sixteen at the time of the
crime, is " 'nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of
pain and suffering,"' and hence an unconstitutional punishment.65
Justice O'Connor, concurring only in the judgment, did not find the
plurality's evidence of a societal consensus against the death penalty for
fifteen-year-old murderers sufficiently persuasive to warrant adopting a
constitutional ban.66 Instead, she voted to reverse Thompson's death
sor Streib states that, between 1900 and November 1, 1986, 21 juvenile offenders who commit-
ted their crimes before age 16 were executed. Professor Streib counts 34 such executions
between 1642 and 1899. V. STREIB, supra note 2, at 57, Table 4-2.
58. This was the execution in Louisiana on January 9, 1948, of Irvin Mattio, 15 years old
at the time of the crime. See V. STREI, supra note 2, at 197.
59. See Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2697; V. STREIB, supra note 2, at 168-69, Table 9-1.
60. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2698 (quoting California v. Brown, 107 S. Ct. 837, 841
(1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
61. Id.
62. Ili at 2699.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2700.
65. Id. (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) (White,
66. Id. at 2706-10 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
January 1989]
sentence because Oklahoma's legislature had failed to set any minimum
age in its death penalty statute. 67 This failure, according to Justice
O'Connor, created "a considerable risk that the Oklahoma legislature
either did not realize that its actions would have the effect of rendering
15-year-old defendants death-eligible or did not give the question the se-
rious consideration that would have been reflected in the explicit choice
of some minimum age for death-eligibility. '68 She declared:
Were it clear that no national consensus forbids the imposition of capi-
tal punishment for crimes committed before the age of 16, the implicit
nature of the Oklahoma legislature's decision would not be constitu-
tionally problematic. In the peculiar circumstances we face today,
however, the Oklahoma statutes have presented this Court with a re-
sult that is of very dubious constitutionality, and they have done so
without the earmarks of careful consideration that we have required
for other kinds of decisions leading to the death penalty. In this
unique situation, I am prepared to conclude that petitioner ... may
not be executed under the authority of a capital punishment statute
that specifies no minimum age at which the commission of a capital
crime can lead to the offender's execution. 69
Justice Scalia, in his dissent, took issue primarily with the plurality's
analysis of the "societal consensus" issue.70 He noted that, outside the
death penalty context, both state and federal legislatures have recently
lowered the minimum age for juvenile criminal responsibility. 71 Within
the death penalty context, he observed that nineteen, or more than half,
of the thirty-seven states with valid capital punishment statutes "have
determined that no minimum age for capital punishment is appropriate,
leaving that to be governed by their general rules for the age at which
juveniles can be criminally responsible. ' 72 He characterized these stat-
utes as representing "the view that death is not different insofar as the
age of juvenile criminal responsibility is concerned. '73 Commenting on
the plurality's evidence of a trend against executing juveniles, Justice
Scalia argued that the plurality's statistics provided "no rational basis for
discerning... a societal judgment that no one so much as a day under 16
can ever be mature and morally responsible enough to deserve that pen-
alty .... ,,74 He found "no justification except our own predilection for
converting a statistical rarity of occurrence into an absolute constitu-
67. Id. at 2711.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2712 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 2715-16.
72. Id. at 2716.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2718 (emphasis in original).
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tional ban."'75
Justice Scalia did not try to refute the plurality's analysis of the rela-
tive culpability of fifteen-year-old murderers, or of the twin purposes of
the death penalty, claiming such analyses to be "irrelevant" to the consti-
tutional issue.76 He argued that the Court's proper role in eighth amend-
ment cases is limited to deciding whether a particular punishment
violates either the original meaning of the amendment or the meaning
that the amendment has taken on in light of the" 'evolving standards of
decency' of our national society."77 He therefore chastised the plurality
for going beyond the "societal consensus" issue and relying instead on
"perceptions of decency, or of penology, or of mercy, entertained-or
strongly entertained, or even held as an 'abiding conviction'-by a ma-
jority of the small and unrepresentative segment of our society that sits
on this Court.' 78
Justice Scalia's dissent concluded by sharply criticizing Justice
O'Connor's concurrence for attempting to engage in "solomonic" but ul-
timately improper efforts to tell the Oklahoma legislature how to do itsjob.79
C. The State of the Law
The current state of constitutional law with respect to the juvenile
death penalty may therefore be summarized as follows. State and lower
federal courts must reverse the death sentence of any murderer whose
crime was committed under the age of sixteen, unless that sentence satis-
fies the test set forth by Justice O'Connor, who provided the crucial fifth
vote for the judgment of reversal in Thompson. Justice O'Connor re-
quired, for the valid imposition of a death sentence against a fifteen-year-
old murderer, that a state explicitly identify, in its death penalty statute,
a minimum age for the death penalty. 0 Because all of the states that
have sentenced fifteen-year-old murderers to death lacked such a mini-
mum age in their respective death penalty statutes at the time the
juveniles were sentenced,81 none of these defendants may be executed.
75. Id
76. Id at 2719.
77. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality
opinion) (Warren, C.J.)).
78. Id
79. Id at 2720-21. Justice Scalia also addressed, and rejected, Thompson's claim regard-
ing the introduction of the photographs of the victim's body. See id. at 2721-22.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
81. As noted by both Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor, every state that had set a
minimum age for the death penalty within its death penalty statute, as of the date of the
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For crimes committed beyond the age of fifteen, however, the issue is
governed by Lockett and Eddings. These cases hold that the youth of a
defendant may be presented to the sentencer as a mitigating factor, but
that a defendant's age alone will not automatically bar the imposition of
the death penalty.
Despite the Court's inability, in three separate cases decided over a
ten year period, to resolve the issue whether the death penalty for
juveniles violates the eighth amendment, the Court has agreed to face the
issue again. On the day after its decision in Thompson was announced,
the Court granted certiorari in the cases of High v. Zant8 2 and Wilkins v.
Missouri.83 Less than four months later, the Court granted certiorari in a
third juvenile death penalty case, Stanford v. Kentucky.84 The defend-
ants in High and Stanford allegedly were seventeen when they committed
their crimes, 85 and the defendant in Wilkins was sixteen.86 The Court, in
each case, granted a writ of certiorari only with respect to the issue of the
constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty. 87 The Wilkins and Stan-
Court's ruling in Thompson, had chosen at least age 16 as the minimum age. Thompson, 108 S.
Ct. at 2695-96 (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J.); id. at 2706 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
82. High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988 (1 1th Cir. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. High v. Zant, 56
U.S.L.W. 3894 (U.S. June 30, 1988) (No. 87-5666).
83. State v. Wilkins, 736 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. Wilkins v. Mis-
souri, 56 U.S.L.W. 3894 (U.S. June 30, 1988) (No. 87-6026).
84. Stanford v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 781 (Ky. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. Stan-
ford v. Kentucky, 57 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1988) (No. 87-5765), as amended, 57
U.S.L.W. 3280 (U.S. Oct. 18, 1988) (No. 87-5765).
85. High, 819 F.2d at 993; Stanford, 734 S.W.2d at 783.
Jose Martinez High was convicted in 1978 of murder, two counts of kidnapping, armed
robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and aggravated assault. He
received the death penalty for the armed robbery, murder, and kidnapping convictions. High,
819 F.2d at 989. The death sentences for the armed robbery and kidnapping convictions were
later reduced to life in prison. Id.; High v. State, 247 Ga. 289, 297, 276 S.E.2d 5, 14 (1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 927 (1982). There is some question as to High's true age. See infra note
88.
Kevin Stanford raped, sodomized, and ultimately shot to death a female gas station at-
tendant during the course of a robbery. He was convicted of murder, first-degree sodomy,
first-degree robbery, and receipt of stolen property. Stanford, 734 S.W.2d at 783.
86. Wilkins, 736 S.W.2d at 415. The defendant, Heath Wilkins, pleaded guilty to the
first-degree murder of a convenience store clerk in Avondale, Missouri, and was sentenced to
death. He also pleaded guilty to a charge of armed criminal action, for which he received a life
sentence, and a charge of unlawful use of a weapon, for which he received a five year sentence.
Id. at 410.
87. High v. Zant, 56 U.S.L.W. 3894 (U.S. June 30, 1988) (No. 87-5666); Stanford v.
Kentucky, 57 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1988) (No. 87-5765), as amended, 57 U.S.L.W.
3280 (U.S. Oct. 18, 1988) (No. 87-5765); Wilkins v. Missouri, 56 U.S.L.W. 3894 (U.S. June 30,
1988) (No. 87-6026).
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ford cases will be argued in early 1989,88 and the decisions should be
forthcoming before the end of the 1988 Term, most likely in June or July
1989.
II. Why Line-Drawing Is Perilous: The Concepts of Cardinal
and Ordinal Proportionality
The juvenile death penalty cases described above share a common
element. In each case, the constitutional issue is framed in terms of a
clear-cut "bright line" based on chronological age, separating those de-
fendants who may receive the death penalty from those who may not.
Such a "bright line" approach seems attractive because it reflects the
criminal law's preference for "rules," as opposed to discretionary, ad hoc
adjudication.89 Tension inevitably exists, however, between the prefer-
ence for rules and the realization that rules can be, and generally are,
both overinclusive and underinclusive. 90 This tension is magnified by the
importance of the interests at stake in a death penalty case.
A. An Introduction to the Problem
The problem with drawing a "bright line" prohibiting the death
penalty for juveniles on the basis of chronological age can perhaps best be
illustrated by example. Consider the facts of Tison v. Arizona,91 a death
penalty case decided by the Supreme Court in 1987. With one small
change in these facts, the Tison case, or one like it, easily could become a
nightmare for the Court if it adopts the proposed "bright line" constitu-
tional ban on the juvenile death penalty.
Ricky and Raymond Tison, brothers, grew up in a "rather amoral"
88. The High case was originally scheduled for oral argument along with the Wilkins
case. In September, however, the State of Georgia moved to dismiss in High because newly
discovered records indicated that the defendant was nineteen years old, not seventeen, at the
time of the crime. See Motion by Respondent to Dismiss for Mootness or Lack of Standing,
High v. Zant, 56 U.S.L.W. 3894 (U.S. June 30, 1988) (No. 87-5666). On October 18, 1988, the
Supreme Court substituted Stanford for High on the oral argument calendar, without an-
nouncing its reason. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 57 U.S.L.W. 3280 (U.S. Oct. 18, 1988) (No. 87-
5765).
89. See Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L.
REv. 591, 652 (1981) ("At the philosophical level, the liberal state's commitment to a rule-like
criminal law is pervasive and grandiose."); see also J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMI-
NAL LAw 25, 28 (2d ed. 1960). "The principle of legality is in some ways the most fundamen-
tal of all principles.... The essence of this principle of legality is limitation on penalization by
the state's officials, effected by the prescription and application of specific rules."
90. See Kelman, supra note 89, at 598-600. But see infra text accompanying notes 226-37
(describing "perfect" bright lines).
91. 107 S. Ct. 1676 (1987).
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home environment under the malevolent influence of their father, Gary
Tison, described as "one of the premier sociopaths of recent Arizona his-
tory."' 92 In 1978, Gary Tison was serving a life term for the killing of a
prison guard during an escape. Ricky and Raymond, along with a third
brother, Donald, plotted another escape for their father and his cellmate,
Randy Greenawalt, also a convicted murderer. On July 30, 1978, the
three Tison brothers entered their father's prison carrying an ice chest
filled with guns. The brothers armed their father and Greenawalt, and
the five men fled the prison without firing a shot.93 After having trouble
with their getaway car, however, the men flagged down a passing car,
stole it, and kidnapped its four occupants, including a two-year-old boy.
The five men drove their victims into the desert, where, while the Tison
brothers took a short walk away from the car in search of water, Gary
Tison and Greenawalt shotgunned the victims to death.94
Ricky and Raymond Tison were convicted of murder based on both
accomplice liability95 and the felony-murder doctrine, 96 and were sen-
tenced to death.97 They appealed their death sentences on the ground
that they were not sufficiently culpable, with respect to the killings, to
satisfy the constitutional requirements of proportional punishment set
forth in Enmund v. Florida.98 The Supreme Court agreed with the
Tisons that the Arizona courts had not used the proper standard in ap-
plying Enmund.99 The Court also held, however, that given the broth-
ers' "major participation" in the underlying felony, their death sentences
92. This was the view of a psychologist who examined the Tison brothers. See Brief for
Petitioners at 11 n.16, Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676 (1987) (No. 84-6075).
93. Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1678.
94. Id. at 1679.
95. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-139 (1956) (repealed Oct. 1, 1978).
96. See id. § 13-452 (1956) (repealed Oct. 1, 1978).
97. Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1680. Donald Tison, the third brother, was killed in a shootout
with police several days after the murders. Gary Tison, the father, escaped into the desert and
subsequently died of exposure. Id. at 1679. Randy Greenawalt was captured, convicted of
murder, and sentenced to death. State v. Greenawalt, 128 Ariz. 150, 176, 624 P.2d 828, 854
(1981).
98. 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982).
99. Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1684. In Enmund, the Supreme Court held that the eighth
amendment prohibits the death penalty for nontriggerman felony-murderers who do not "kill,
attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed." En-
mund, 458 U.S. at 797. In reviewing the death sentences handed down against the Tison
brothers, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that the "intent to kill" described in Enmund
included those situations in which the defendant "anticipated that lethal force would or might
be used or that life would or might be taken in accomplishing the underlying felony." State v.
Tison, 142 Ariz. 454, 456, 690 P.2d 755, 757 (1984), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 1676 (1987). The
Supreme Court, however, rejected this attempt by the Arizona court "to reformulate 'intent to
kill' as a species of foreseeability." Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1684.
[Vol. 40
JUVENILES AND THE DEATH PENALTY
could stand under Enmund so long as the Arizona courts found on re-
mand that their behavior manifested "reckless indifference to the value of
human life." 100 The Court reviewed the record and found it sufficient to
support the required findings of reckless indifference.101 In the course of
this review, the Court noted that the behavior of the Tison brothers "dif-
fer[ed] in slight details only."10 2
According to the Tison Court, Ricky Tison was twenty years old at
the time of the crime, and Raymond was nineteen.10 3 Because Arizona
had set no minimum age for either the waiver of juvenile offenders into
the adult court system or for the death penalty, however, the age of the
Tison brothers was irrelevant except as a potential mitigating factor
under Lockett and Eddings, at the capital sentencing hearing. 104
A slightly altered version of the Tison facts illustrates the problem
created if a "bright line" prohibits imposition of the death penalty on
murderers below a given age. If Ricky had been eighteen years old at the
time of the crime and Raymond only seventeen, it would be difficult to
justify sentencing Ricky to death while sparing Raymond solely because
he was a minor. The Court stated in Tison that the brothers were equally
and sufficiently culpable to warrant the death penalty as a matter of
eighth amendment proportionality doctrine. 10 5 Because they were
equally culpable, they should be punished equally.
This scenario is by no means limited to the realm of hypothetical
cases invented by law professors. English history provides a glaring ex-
ample of two defendants treated differently on the basis of chronological
age alone. "On November 3, 1952 a London policeman was killed in a
gun battle while attempting to apprehend two youths who had broken
into a warehouse. The youths were Christopher Craig, aged 16, and
Derek Bentley, aged 19."1°6 The evidence showed, beyond a shadow of a
doubt, that the younger man, Craig, was the actual killer. In fact, Bent-
ley apparently had been arrested before the fatal shot was fired. More-
over, Bentley was partially mentally deficient. Both Craig and Bentley
were convicted of murder, Bentley's conviction being based on the doc-
100. Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1688.
101. Id. at 1684.
102. Id. at 1684-85. The only difference noted by the Court was the fact that Raymond
"performed the crucial role of flagging down a passing car occupied by an innocent family
whose fate was then entrusted to the known killers he had previously armed." Id. at 1685.
103. Id. at 1680.
104. The trial judge specifically found that the Tison brothers' youth was a nonstatutory
mitigating factor. Nevertheless, the judge sentenced both brothers to death. Id.
105. Id. at 1684-85.
106. J. CHRISTOPH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND BRITISH POLITICS 98 (1962).
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trine of constructive malice. Because Craig was only sixteen at the time
of the crime, he could not receive the death penalty under English law.
Bentley, on the other hand, was sentenced to death and executed. 10 7
The Bentley-Craig case unleashed a firestorm of criticism against the
death penalty in England, much of the criticism leveled at the compara-
tive injustice of executing Bentley, the less culpable murderer, while
Craig, the more culpable, was spared. 10 8 The Howard Journal wrote at
the time, "Seldom has any execution caused so much controversy and
public concern ... [or] such scenes of public emotion, in Parliament and
outside, [or so much criticism of a] Home Secretary for refusing to grant
a reprieve."' 1 9 The Bentley-Craig case, along with two other celebrated
instances of apparent injustice in the administration of the death penalty,
ultimately served as a catalyst for the effective abolition, in 1957, of the
death penalty in England. 10
The hypothetical and real cases described above are troubling not
only, or even primarily, because of a feeling that the nonjuvenile mur-
derer in each case, considered independently, did not deserve the death
penalty. In fact, in the hypothetical case based upon the facts of Tison,
four members of the current Supreme Court have already declared that,
in their view and on such facts, the death penalty would not be dispro-
portionate to the crime."' And while Derek Bentley undeniably was a
107. See R. PAGET & S. SILVERMAN, HANGED-AND INNOCENT? 89-105 (1953).
108. After the Home Secretary, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, refused to grant a reprieve and
spare Bentley's life, a motion was placed on the Order Paper in the House of Commons. The
motion, which was signed by 200 Members and later presented to the Home Secretary, read:
That this House respectfully dissents from the opinion of the Home Secretary, that
there are not sufficient grounds on which to advise the exercise of Her Majesty's
mercy in the case of Derek Bentley and urges him to reconsider the matter so as to
give effect to the jury's recommendation and to the expressed view of the Lord Chief
Justice that Bentley's guilt was less than that of Christopher Craig.
Id. at 105; see also J. CHRISTOPH, supra note 106, at 99.
109. 8 HOWARD J. 227 (1953). In the Picture Post, another writer, Kenneth Allsop, com-
pared the state of public emotion to that which had overtaken the country at the time of
Dunkirk and at the death of King George VI. See J. CHRISTOPH, supra note 106, at 99; R.
PAGET & S. SILVERMAN, supra note 107, at 106.
110. "It is difficult not to believe that had the several Home Secretaries chosen the other
alternatives open to them in each of these cases, the subsequent successes of the abolitionists
would not have come about." J. CHRISTOPH, supra note 106, at 107.
The other two cases that served as catalysts for the abolition movement in England were
the Evans-Christie case, which involved a man, Timothy Evans, who, in light of later-discov-
ered evidence, appeared to have been innocent of the murder for which he was executed; and
the Ellis case, which involved a young and attractive woman, Ruth Ellis, who was hanged
despite the pleas of thousands that she, by virtue of being a woman, should receive mercy. See
id. at 100-07. Together, the three cases "shocked sensitivities and raised in diverse quarters
serious doubts over the character of British justice." Id. at 97.
11I. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia, along with former Justice
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poor candidate for the death penalty, it seems unlikely that his plight
would have attracted such attention without the juxtaposition of his case
with that of Christopher Craig. Rather, what is most troubling about
these cases is that they raise difficult issues of comparative justice, in the
context of the most severe punishment that society can impose against a
person who has been convicted of a crime. These cases therefore will, or
should, make one think more carefully about the basic principles of re-
tributive justice and, especially, about the relationship between just
deserts and equality.
B. Fundamentals of Retributive Justice
Retributivism, or retributive justice, is a theory of punishment that
has undergone a vigorous revival in the United States during the last ten
or fifteen years. In 1976 Andrew von Hirsch, who was serving as Execu-
tive Director of the Committee for the Study of Incarceration, sponsored
by the Field and New World Foundations, authored an influential book
entitled Doing Justice.x 2 In this book, which constituted the Commit-
tee's report, von Hirsch advocated a retributive theory of punishment
based on the Kantian principle of "just deserts."'1 13 This kind of retribu-
tivism, which in modem times has been labelled "protective retributiv-
ism,"11 4 "moral retributivism," 15 and the "principle of personhood," 116
focuses not on the vengeful reactions of the victim of a crime or of others
in society, but instead on the importance of treating the defendant as a
"person" by responding to his or her conduct in a manner that respects
the defendant's choice to engage in such conduct. 117 As von Hirsch
Powell, joined Justice O'Connor's opinion stating that the record "would support a finding of
the culpable mental state of reckless indifference to human life," which in turn would warrant
the imposition of the death penalty against the Tison brothers. Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct.
1676, 1684 (1987).
112. A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976) [hereinafter A. VON HIRSCH, JUSTICE].
113. Von Hirsch used the phrase, "commensurate deserts," to describe the form of retribu-
tivism advocated in his book. Id. at 66.
114. Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1168-69 (1980).
115. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 991 (1985).
116. Dressier, Substantive Criminal Law Through the Looking Glass of Rummel v. Estelle:
Proportionality and Justice as Endangered Doctrines, 34 Sw. L.J. 1063, 1073 (1981).
117. J. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 229-30 (1979); Morris, Persons
and Punishment, reprinted in PUNISHMENT 75 (J. Feinberg & H. Gross eds. 1975); see also A.
VON HIRSCH, JUSTICE, supra note 112, at 52 (distinguishing between so-called "channeling"
retributivism, which focuses on the utility of "channeling" society's instinct for vengeance, and
"just deserts" or Kantian retributivism).
The Supreme Court seems unable, or unwilling, to recognize that there are at least two
distinct kinds of retributivism. For an example of an opinion using the term to describe the
Kantian, justice-based retributivism, see Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)
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stated, "The very concept of deserved punishment.., looks to the per-
son's past wrongs. His deserts depend on his choice--on his having cho-
sen to act (and having acted) wrongfully .. " .,118 This justice-based
ideal, that punishment should be assessed solely on the basis of the "just
deserts" of the offender, represents a dramatic departure from the view
that punishment should serve the utilitarian goals of rehabilitation and
deterrence. 119
(1) The Cardinal and Ordinal Requirements of Proportionality
The central concept within the aforementioned theory of retributive
justice is proportionality. Proportionality involves two closely related re-
quirements. The first requirement of proportionality is that punishment,
in order to be "just," must be proportional to the seriousness of the
crime.1 20 Seriousness, in turn, is based on the harm caused or threatened
by the crime and the culpability of the offender.121 If an offender acts
intentionally, and there are no mitigating circumstances, he or she is
("[p]utting Enmund to death to avenge two killings that he did not commit and had no inten-
tion of committing or causing does not measurably contribute to the retributive end of ensur-
ing that the criminal gets his just deserts"). For an example of an opinion using the term in the
very different sense of "channeling," vengeance-based retributivism, see Tison v. Arizona, 107
S. Ct. 1676, 1700 & n.19 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[r]etribution... has as its core logic
the crude proportionality of 'an eye for an eye,' " and can be pursued validly only "when 'the
administration of criminal justice' works to 'channe[l]' society's 'instinct for retribution' ")
(quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308
(1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
This confusion is not limited to Supreme Court opinions. See COUNCIL OF JUDGES, NA-
TIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, MODEL SENTENCING ACT (2d ed. 1972),
reprinted in 18 CRIME & DELINQ. 335, 344 (1972) ("sentences should not be based upon re-
venge and retribution").
118. A. VON HIRSCH, JUSTICE, supra note 112, at 125.
119. For a brief history of the modem revival of retributivism, see A. VON HIRSCH, PAST
OR FUTURE CRIMES 3-12 (1987) [hereinafter A. VON HIRSCH, CRIMES]. For a general discus-
sion of the rehabilitative approach to punishment, see PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION (J.
Murphy ed. 1973). For a general discussion of the deterrence model, see F. ZIMRING, PER-
SPECTIVES ON DETERRENCE (1971).
120. As von Hirsch stated:
If one asks how severely a wrongdoer deserves to be punished, a familiar principle
comes to mind: Severity of punishment should be commensurate with the seriousness
of the wrong. Only grave wrongs merit severe penalties; minor misdeeds deserve leni-
ent punishments. Disproportionate penalties are undeserved-severe sanctions for
minor wrongs or vice versa.
A. VON HIRSCH, JUSTICE, supra note 112, at 66; see also J. DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL LAW 34 (1987) ("[r]etributive theory ... requires that the wrongdoer symbolically
repay the debt he owes by undergoing punishment proportional in degree to the offense
committed").
121. Robert Nozick, for example, has suggested that proportionality can be expressed in
mathematical terms by the formula "r X H," where "r" represents the degree of the offender's
responsibility for the crime, which is dependent upon his or her culpability (and will range
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deemed fully responsible for the crime. In such a case, the seriousness of
the crime will depend upon the harm caused. Even so, however, it does
not necessarily follow that a proportional punishment must correspond
precisely to the harm caused, in the sense of lex talionis.122 Instead, a
proportional punishment will be defined in terms of whatever the partic-
ular society views as appropriate for the crime. 123 This kind of propor-
tionality, which deals with the relationship between the seriousness of a
given offender's crime and the punishment imposed against the offender,
is called "cardinal" proportionality.1 24
Proportionality also imposes a second requirement, however, and it
is a requirement no less important in terms of retributive justice than the
between 0% and 100%), and "H" represents the harm caused by the crime (and can be unlim-
ited). R. NozICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 363-66 (1981).
Another, and perhaps a somewhat better, explanation of the relationship between culpa-
bility, harm, and seriousness is that of Hyman Gross. He suggests that the "culpability" of
criminal conduct (Gross uses this term as a synonym for what this Article calls "seriousness")
depends upon: (1) the harm it threatens; (2) the degree of risk of the harm occurring; (3) the
actor's control over the harm-threatening aspects of his conduct; and (4) the legitimacy of the
conduct under the circumstances. H. GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 74-88 (1979).
Gross' formulation explicitly recognizes that the same conduct can, given events beyond the
control of the actor, result in widely differing amounts of harm. The existence and effects of
such fortuities must be accounted for in a complete retributive theory of punishment, although
many such theories in vogue today do not even attempt to do so.
For a worthwhile recent discussion of the philosophical difficulties posed by the use of
harm as a component in determining punishment under a retributive theory, see G.
FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE 63-83 (1988) (discussing the infamous Bernhard
Goetz trial). As Fletcher explains:
The relevance of the victim's suffering in the criminal law poses a serious hurdle to
the struggle for reasoned principles in the law. Generations of theorists have sought
to explain why we punish actual homicide more severely than attempted homicide,
the real spilling of blood more severely than the unrealized intent to do so. Our
combined philosophical work has yet to generate a satisfactory account of why the
realization of harm aggravates the penalty. Yet the practice persists in every legal
system of the Western world. We cannot adequately explain why harm matters, but
matter it does.
Id. at 82-83.
122. Literally, "lex talionis" means "law of retaliation."
But what is the mode and measure of punishment which public justice takes as its
principle and standard? It is just the principle of equality, by which the pointer of
the scale of justice is made to incline no more to the one side than the other. It may
be rendered by saying that the undeserved evil which any one commits on another, is
to be regarded as perpetrated on himself.
I. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 194-98 (W. Hastie trans. 1887), reprinted in PHILOSOPHI-
CAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 103-04 (G. Ezorsky ed. 1972). The concept of lex ta-
lionis is one aspect of Kant's retributive theory of punishment that has not been adopted by the
modern retributivists. See, eg., A. VON HIRSCH, JUSTICE, supra note 112, at 160 n.4b.
123. A. VON HIRSCH, JUSTICE, supra note 112, at 73 n.*.
124. The terminology has been adopted by von Hirsch to assist in describing the various
requirements of proportionality. See A. VON HIRSCH, CRIMES, supra note 119, at 43-46.
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requirement of cardinal proportionality. This is the requirement that of-
fenders whose "just deserts" are equal, in terms of the seriousness of their
crimes, receive equal punishments, and offenders whose "just deserts"
are different are punished differently.1 25 This kind of proportionality,
which deals with comparisons between the deserts and punishments
of different offenders, is called "ordinal" or "comparative"
proportionality. 126
If one could identify the single "just" punishment for each crime
and the person who committed it, in terms of cardinal proportionality,
and if one could design a sentencing system that would impose only such
"just" punishments, then such a system necessarily would also satisfy the
requirement of ordinal proportionality. Cardinal proportionality, how-
ever, can never be such an exact science. I 27 As Norval Morris has ex-
plained, we can say that certain punishments are disproportionate,
because they are either grossly severe or grossly lenient in terms of soci-
ety's view of the seriousness of the crime. 128 But, at least in terms of
cardinal proportionality, we cannot say that any particular punishment is
the single "just" punishment for a given offender and crime. 129 Cardinal
proportionality thus serves as a crude limiting device, not as a precise
measure of punishment.
Ordinal proportionality, on the other hand, permits us to make
more precise judgments about the "justice" or "injustice" of punishments
imposed against two or more offenders. As von Hirsch has noted, once a
given offender receives a particular punishment from within the range of
punishments that satisfy the requirement of cardinal proportionality,
then we may conclude whether the particular punishment imposed
against another offender is ordinally proportional. 30 The imposition of
punishment against the first offender provides a frame of reference for
assessing the "justice" of the second offender's punishment.
(2) The Relationship Between Cardinal and Ordinal Proportionality
This difference in precision between the kinds of judgments we can
125. See id. at 40. Von Hirsch calls the first half of this requirement, involving the like
treatment of like offenders, "parity," and the second half, involving the unlike treatment of
unlike offenders, "rank ordering." Id.
126. See id. at 40-43.
127. See id. at 45; N. MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 198 (1982).
128. Miller & Morris, Predictions of Dangerousness: Ethical Concerns and Proposed Lim-
its, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 393, 434 (1986).
129. Id. Morris therefore contends that, within the range of cardinally "just" punish-
ments, considerations of utility may be used to determine which particular punishment to
impose against a given offender. Id. at 435.
130. A. VON HIRSCH, CRIMES, supra note 119, at 43-46.
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make about the cardinal and ordinal proportionality of punishments
might suggest that, in some fundamental way, the two kinds of propor-
tionality are theoretically distinct. One might conclude, for instance,
that cardinal proportionality involves an effort to determine, in some
rough sense, the "absolute" justice of a particular punishment for a given
offender and crime, wholly independent of the punishments that have
been imposed against other offenders who have committed other
crimes.131 One might view ordinal proportionality as involving a quite
different comparative process, requiring an examination of the respective
deserts and punishments of two or more offenders. 132 Such an approach,
treating cardinal and ordinal proportionality as theoretically distinct, has
permitted Norval Morris to argue that the principles of retributive justice
require only cardinally, and not ordinally, proportional punishments. 133
Despite the significant difference in precision between the kinds of
judgments they entail, however, cardinal and ordinal proportionality are
not theoretically distinct. In fact, both kinds of proportionality necessar-
ily involve a comparative process. This is because the basic retributive
concept of "desert" and the notion of individual responsibility on which
it depends involve not merely objective facts and circumstances that can
be observed and proven, but also a set of beliefs about the extent of "free
will" in a fundamentally deterministic world.134
Lloyd Weinreb, in his recent book, Natural Law and Justice, ex-
plains the impossibility of fixing desert:
Desert... is not often put to the test of specificity and even resists it.
Not fixed in advance by a rule, it may take into account an unlimited
range of circumstances. The lex talionis, eye for an eye and tooth for a
tooth, has nothing to recommend it as a measure of desert. It attracts
us nonetheless, because its insistence on symmetry between an act and
the deserved response relieves us of the burden of considering every
particularity in the circumstances that might have a bearing on the
actor's desert. 135
The "circumstances" that might be viewed as relevant to a given of-
fender's desert, and therefore to the proportionality of a particular pun-
131. For example, von Hirsch speaks in terms of the "absolute" deserved penalty for a
given offender and crime, under the doctrine of cardinal proportionality. Id. at 43.
132. See id. ("Assessments of ordinal proportionality rest on familiar judgments of com-
parative blameworthiness. When judged in absolute, rather than comparative terms, however,
the censure expressed through penal deprivation is a convention .... ").
133. See Morris, Punishment, Desert and Rehabilitation, reprinted in SENTENCING 257,
268-69 (H. Gross & A. von Hirsch eds. 1981); see also infra note 143.
134. See Kelman, supra note 89, at 597-98 (discussing how "intentionalism" and "deter-
minism" operate as "interpretive constructs" influencing the resolution of issues in the sub-
stantive criminal law).
135. L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 217-18 (1987).
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ishment, go far beyond the typical criminal law "excuses" and
"justifications." They include anything in the entire life history of the
offender that might, in a deterministic sense, have caused the offender to
act in the way that he did.' 36 How many of these circumstances should
be viewed as relevant to a given offender's desert, or, to use Robert
Nozick's phrase, "how far down desert will go,' 137 is not a judgment
based on anything inherent in the term "desert." Rather, it is a judgment
based on our individual and communal beliefs about the fundamental
nature of human beings. 138
This does not mean that we can make no judgments at all about
desert. In fact, we make such judgments all of the time, and we would be
denying our essential humanity if we did not. 139 What it does mean,
136. One commentator has suggested that the criminal law in general serves to narrow the
range of inquiry into all of the various aspects of the defendant's life history, which might
otherwise be viewed as relevant to the defendant's responsibility for the crime charged, by
relying on certain "interpretive constructs." See Kelman, supra note 89, at 593-94, 596.
137. R. NoZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 225-26 (1974).
138. Weinreb distinguishes between the "constitutive" and "circumstantial" attributes of a
person:
In its fullest generality, the idea of justice draws a boundary between a person and
the contingent circumstances of his existence. On one side of the boundary are those
attributes that are constitutive of a person as he is. Insofar as a person's conduct is
traceable to such attributes, it is traceable to the person himself; and, therefore, he
can justly be held responsible for it. On the other side are attributes that are not
constitutive but circumstantial. Conduct traceable to attributes of this kind is not
traceable to the person, any more than an event in which he was not involved at all.
Accordingly, he cannot justly be held responsible.
L. WEINREB, supra note 135, at 236-37.
There is no way to justify, in logical terms, any particular dividing line between the "con-
stitutive" and "circumstantial" attributes of a person. John Rawls, for example, takes the view
that virtually none of a person's attributes should be treated as constitutive, because nearly all
such attributes are fortuitous and undeserved. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-17
(1971); id. at 104 ("no one deserves his place in the distribution of native endowments, any
more than one deserves one's initial starting place in society"). Thus, Rawls ultimately con-
cludes that society may justly redistribute "all social values" in an effort to serve the welfare of
all of its members. Id. at 60-65. Robert Nozick, at the other extreme, claims that almost all of
a person's attributes and possessions should be viewed as constitutive, and that society there-
fore acts unjustly if it redistributes such attributes or their fruits against the will of their posses-
sors. R. NOZICK, supra note 137, at 172.
In practice, the dividing line between the "constitutive" and "circumstantial" attributes of
a person is drawn on the basis of convention and human experience, not logic. See L. WEIN-
REB, supra note 135, at 241-49 ("Within a community at any time, some attributes will be
regarded as so certainly constitutive of the person that their significance for justice is not
questioned").
139. "We may decide that, so far as we are able, persons will or will not get what they
deserve. But so long as we think of them as persons, who act with freedom and moral respon-
sibility, we cannot decide that they will not deserve. They just do." L. WEINREB, supra note
135, at 215; see also A. VON HIRSCH, CRIMES, supra note 119, at 43 ("Yet such assessments-
of how harmful the conduct is, how culpable the actor has been, how painful the punishment
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however, is that the judgment about "how far down desert will go" in
any given case must be based on a comparison, either with the entire
background of our human experience, involving all of the other cases in
which we have previously considered the question of desert, or with the
circumstances of some other particular case. There is simply no other
way to "fix" a given offender's desert.
The first kind of comparison, involving our entire experiential back-
ground, is the process by which we evaluate cardinal proportionality.
Cardinal proportionality does not involve the "absolute" justice of a par-
ticular punishment, because the notion of "absolute" justice is incompre-
hensible, given the impossibility of "absolutely" fixing desert. Instead,
cardinal proportionality involves a comparison between the offender in
question and the countless other offenders whose desert we have evalu-
ated before. As Weinreb has stated, "Unable to reason from a general
principle to specific applications, we build up a picture of the world from
innumerable concrete instances; we learn how to regard one case after
another and extend that learning to other similar cases." 140 Because of
the daunting nature of this task, we necessarily limit our consideration to
only certain aspects of the life history of the given offender. 141 We gener-
alize and categorize, instead of trying to focus on all of the circumstances
that make the given offender's case unique, and in doing so we reduce the
offender to a member of a class. This is why the best we can do in any
case, involving a given offender and crime, is to identify a range of cardi-
nally proportional punishments.
The second kind of comparison, involving an examination of the re-
spective deserts and punishments of particular offenders, is the process
by which we evaluate ordinal proportionality. The greater precision of
our judgments about ordinal proportionality is simply a consequence of
the comparative process involved. Unlike cardinal proportionality, ordi-
nal proportionality involves a comparison between a small number of
particular cases, thus permitting us to consider carefully exactly which of
the myriad differences between the cases should be viewed as relevant to
the offenders' deserts and punishments. 142 The process of comparing
is-have their roots in moral and practical judgments that ordinary persons make in everyday
life.").
140. L. WEINREB, supra note 135, at 244. On the relationship between justice and conven-
tion, Weinreb says, "Without reference to the conventions of a community, in the deep sense of
the Greek nomos, the idea of justice has no specific content. It expresses the abstract, anti-
nomic requirements of desert according to freedom and freedom according to desert." Id. at
248.
141. See Kelman, supra note 89, at 593-94, 596.
142. Weinreb concedes that, in what he calls "competitive situations," desert "may seem
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particular offenders helps us to determine "how far down desert will go"
in either case--desert cannot go any further down for one offender than
it does for the other. 143
to be specific." L. WEINREB, supra note 135, at 217 n.*. He attributes this specificity to the
fact that such situations involve "entitlements." Thus, for example, when Antilochus finishes
second in the chariot race described in the Iliad, we can say that he "deserves" the second
prize, simply because he is "entitled" to it under the rules of the race. See id. at 186, 217 n.*.
The specificity of which Weinreb speaks, however, is not limited to "competitive situa-
tions." Instead, it obtains in all comparative situations. And the reason for the specificity is
not simply the fact that an "entitlement" is involved, but rather the fact that the very process
of comparing particular cases permits us to identify with precision the factors that we will
allow to influence our judgments about desert.
Thus, in the example of the chariot race, the rules of the race create the "entitlement" by
defining which factors will be relevant to desert (i.e., the order in which one's chariot crosses
the finish line) and which will not (i.e., the skill of the charioteers, pursuant to which Eumelos,
and not Antilochus, would have "deserved" the second prize). See id. at 186.
143. Andrew von Hirsch and Norval Morris have disagreed about the very existence of a
justice-based requirement of ordinal proportionality. Morris has argued that imposing differ-
ent punishments against offenders of equal desert (he uses the term "anisonomy" to describe
this situation) is not unjust, so long as both punishments are within the range of acceptable
punishments defined by the requirements of cardinal proportionality. Miller & Morris, supra
note 128, at 434-35. Von Hirsch agrees with Morris that cardinal proportionality establishes
only broad limits on punishment, but asserts that retributive principles also impose an in-
dependent requirement of equal treatment, or ordinal proportionality. Thus, according to von
Hirsch, anisonomic punishments are unjust. See von Hirsch, Selective Incapacitation Reexam-
ined: The National Academy of Sciences' Report on Criminal Careers and "Career Criminals,"
7 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 19, 27, 28 (1988).
Both of these arguments are erroneous, although von Hirsch's conclusion about the injus-
tice of anisonomic punishments is correct. The error stems from the assumption that "desert"
has some kind of fixed meaning, and that the problem of defining a cardinally proportional
punishment is simply a problem of human inability to translate desert into an appropriate
punishment. Thus, von Hirsch attributes the imprecision of cardinal proportionality to the
fact that "desert ... does not provide or purport to provide us with a unique set of anchoring
points for the penalty scale." Id. at 28. Similarly, Morris concludes that there is a broad range
of just punishments for a given offense because "we lack the moral calipers to say with preci-
sion of a given punishment, 'That was a just punishment.'" Miller & Morris, supra note 128,
at 434.
Morris goes from this observation to the conclusion that there is nothing "unjust" about
anisonomic punishments, because so long as we have a good, albeit non-desert based, reason
for assigning unequal punishments, we can call such an assignment "just." Morris, supra note
133, at 257, 268-69. Von Hirsch, on the other hand, claims that Morris' definition of "justice,"
as including at least certain kinds of unequal treatment, works only for "simple" government-
created burdens and benefits, and is inapplicable to the special context of punishment. Von
Hirsch, supra, at 27-28. Thus, von Hirsch concludes, anisonomic punishments are "unjust."
Id.
If both Morris and von Hirsch were correct in believing that the concept of ordinal pro-
portionality must somehow be derived independently from the concept of cardinal proportion-
ality, and that the "justice" or "injustice" of anisonomic punishments is therefore unrelated to
cardinal proportionality, then Morris would surely be correct in asserting that anisonomic
punishments could not be called "unjust" solely because they involve "unequal" treatment.
As Weinreb has put it, in discussing claims of "equality,"
the treatment of the other person is significant only as evidence to establish one's
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40
JUVENILES AND THE DEATH PENALTY
A helpful way of thinking about the relationship between desert and
equality, and about the closely related concepts of cardinal and ordinal
proportionality, is by analogy. For instance, consider the judging of a
gymnastics competition. The particular score a gymnast receives for her
performance can be analogized to the punishment imposed against an
offender who commits a crime. And, much like the retributive theory of
punishment, we could agree on a principle of "just scoring." Under this
principle a gymnast's score should be based solely on her "just deserts,"
or on a combination of the "difficulty" of her chosen routine and the
quality or "worthiness" of her individual performance. 144
When the first gymnast in the competition completes her perform-
ance, the judges must decide what score to assign to that performance.
One obvious problem for the judges will be to establish a correspondence
between the elements of "difficulty" and "worthiness" and the ten-point
scale used for scoring the performances. 145 But even if we assume that
the judges are given some fixed criteria for deciding the weight to be
given to the various aspects of each performance, and some fixed stan-
dards for converting the "difficulty" and "worthiness" of each perform-
ance into a score between zero and ten points, the judges must still decide
independent claim. For unless the claim can be established on that basis, it may be
defeated by reference to any difference between the claimant and the other per-
son.... What appears to be an argument from equality depends rather on unex-
pressed assumptions about the kind of factors that give rise to the desert or
entitlement in question.
L. WEINREB, supra note 135, at 164-65 (1987).
The problem of imprecision in cardinal proportionality, however, is not attributable solely
to the punishment scale. Even if we had a clear rule for translating desert into punishment
(which is at least theoretically possible-for example, if a society applied the lex talionis in a
literal fashion), we still would be unable to determine a single "just" punishment for a given
offender and crime. This is because, in a single case, there is no way to fix "desert" in a precise
fashion. We can determine a given offender's "desert," as explained in the text, only by a
process of comparison with countless other cases.
In the end, cardinal and ordinal proportionality are much more closely related than either
Morris or von Hirsch are willing to admit. Both kinds of proportionality utilize comparative
processes to "fix" desert. One simply does a more effective job of "fixing" desert than the
other. Thus, whether one says that a punishment is cardinally or ordinally disproportionate,
one in either event is saying exactly the same thing: that the punishment is not based on the
defendant's "desert," in whatever way we have managed to "fix" the meaning of that term.
144. This is analogous to the way in which "desert" depends on both harm and culpabil-
ity. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
145. This is analogous to the process of translating judgments about desert, in whatever
way we manage to make such judgments, into a particular punishment or range of punish-
ments. See supra note 143. In recent years, some legislatures have created sentencing commis-
sions to implement this particular aspect of determining "just" punishments. See generally A.
VON HIRSCH, K. KNAPP & M. TONRY, THE SENTENCING COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES
(1987) (discussing the trend toward use of "determinate" sentencing guidelines).
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exactly how "worthy" the first gymnast's performance has been. 146 How
will the judges decide the "worthiness" of the first performance?
The process of determining the "worthiness" of the first perform-
ance, and of then assigning a score to that performance, resembles the
process of determining the range of cardinally proportional punishments
for a given offender and crime. An experienced gymnastics judge evalu-
ates the first gymnast's performance against the background of all of the
performances the judge has seen before, and thereby makes a rough judg-
ment about the "worthiness" of the performance. 147 The judge uses this
rough judgment, in conjunction with the fixed scoring standards, to as-
sign a score to the performance. The background of the judge's experi-
ence establishes limits on the score that may "justly" be given to the first
gymnast. As with cardinal proportionality, however, these "justice" lim-
its are likely to be imprecise. Assuming, for example, that the first gym-
nast performed fairly well, there would be nothing inherently "unjust"
about giving her a score of 6.5, or a 7.0, or a 7.5, or even an 8.0. All we
can say, with any degree of certainty, is that it would be "unjust," in
terms of the judge's past experience and our principle of "just scoring,"
for the judge to give the first gymnast a 4.0, or a 10.0, for a pretty good
performance.
The situation changes significantly when the second gymnast com-
pletes her performance. Now the judge has a specific basis, or frame of
reference, for evaluating the "worthiness" of the second gymnast's per-
formance. For example, if the judge ignored some facet of the first gym-
nast's performance, such as the positioning of her left hand during a
certain maneuver, in the course of determining the "worthiness" of the
first gymnast's performance, then the judge must also ignore the same
facet of the second gymnast's performance. 148 This makes the judge's
task similar to the process of evaluating the ordinal proportionality of a
particular set of punishments. Any difference in the gymnasts' scores
146. This is analogous to the general problem of "fixing" desert. See supra notes 139-43
and accompanying text.
147. If this is the first gymnastics performance the judge has ever seen, then the choice of a
score for the first gymnast will be meaningless, in terms of our principle of "just deserts";
likewise, the concept of an "absolutely" just punishment, absent some basis for comparison, is
incomprehensible. Imagine, for example, a judge from an alien planet, where not only are
there no gymnastics competitions, but the residents of the planet are not even capable of loco-
motion. Such a judge, who has never before seen a creature move, would have absolutely no
basis for determining the "worthiness" of the first gymnast's performance, and hence what
score to give to the first gymnast. A score of 0.0 would be no more or less "just," coming from
our alien judge, than a score of 10.0.
148. This is analogous to the process of determining "how far down desert will go." See
supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 40
JUVENILES AND THE DEATH PENALTY
must, in order to satisfy our principle of "just scoring," be justified in
terms of either a difference in the "worthiness" of the performances, or in
their "difficulty," if the content of the two routines was different.
Although it would not be inherently "unjust" for the judge to assign any
score between 6.5 and 8.0 to the first gymnast's performance, it undoubt-
edly would violate our principle of "just scoring" for the judge to give the
second gymnast the same score as the first, if the second gymnast's per-
formance was less "worthy" than that of the first. 1 49 Alternatively, if the
two performances were exactly the same in terms of their "difficulty" and
"worthiness," surely we would insist that the judge give both gymnasts
the same score. 150
The gymnastics analogy highlights both aspects of the relationship
between cardinal and ordinal proportionality. First, the analogy illus-
trates the theoretical connection between the two concepts, both of
which necessarily involve comparative judgments. This theoretical con-
nection suggests that a retributive theory of punishment must incorpo-
rate both kinds of proportionality. Second, the analogy emphasizes the
point that, although cardinal and ordinal proportionality involve similar
comparative processes, it is generally much more difficult to determine
whether a particular punishment is cardinally proportional than it is to
determine whether a series of punishments satisfies ordinal
proportionality.
(3) The State of the Debate on a Ban
The difference in precision between judgments based on cardinal
and ordinal proportionality explains why the opponents of a ban on the
juvenile death penalty have missed the mark, thus far, with their argu-
ment from retributive justice. By focusing on the cardinal proportional-
ity aspect of retributive justice, opponents of a ban effectively concede the
point before the debate begins. Even assuming that a murder is serious
enough to merit the death penalty as a matter of retributive justice, a life
sentence would in most cases also be within the broad range of cardinally
proportional punishments for such a crime, because it would not be
"grossly lenient" in relation to the seriousness of the crime. 151 In fact, it
149. This is a consequence of the ordinal proportionality requirement of "rank-ordering."
See supra note 125.
150. This is a consequence of the ordinal proportionality requirement of "parity." See
supra note 125. Another common way of looking at the situation is to say that, although there
is nothing inherently "unjust" about the fact that a particular judge gives uniformly high or
low marks, it is "unjust" if the judge does not give such high or low marks consistently to all of
the gymnasts in the competition.
151. But see Markman & Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-
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is very difficult to conclude that the imposition of a life sentence for even
a particularly heinous murder committed by a juvenile violates the re-
quirement of cardinal proportionality. Thus, the advocates of a ban on
the juvenile death penalty have the upper hand, if the debate is cast solely
in terms of cardinal proportionality.
Despite this weakness in the cardinal proportionality argument
against a "bright line" ban on the juvenile death penalty, however, the
ordinal proportionality argument is quite strong. It is hard to deny that,
to use the oft-quoted language from Furman v. Georgia, 15 2 the imposition
of the death penalty against Ricky Tison but not against Raymond,
under the hypothetical facts described above, would be as "arbitrary"
and "freakish" as being struck by lightning. The only difference between
the two brothers that could explain the life-and-death difference in pun-
ishments, by hypothesis, would be the accident of birth that Ricky ap-
peared a year before Raymond was born.1 53 Moreover, in light of the
Bentley-Craig case, 154 it does not strain credulity to assert that compara-
tive injustice is certain to result from the proposed "bright line" ban on
the juvenile death penalty based on chronological age. 155
The problem with using age as a "bright line" in the juvenile death
penalty cases is that age, standing alone, is not the reason why it is at
least arguably unjust to impose the death penalty on many juveniles.
Rather, age is simply a "proxy" for a combination of factors such as
maturity, judgment, responsibility, and the capability to assess the possi-
ble consequences of one's conduct.1 56 The absence of these qualities ar-
Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121, 158 & n.224 (1988); Van den Haag, Comment on John
Kaplan's "Administering Capital Punishment, " 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 193, 193 (1984) ("[D]oing
justice requires capital punishment as the only appropriate retribution for some crimes....
[S]ome crimes deserve no less.").
152. 408 U.S. 238, 295, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
153. The case could be made even more troubling, albeit less likely to occur, by hypothe-
sizing that Ricky and Raymond Tison were adoptive brothers, and that Ricky was just one day
over the age of eighteen when the crime was committed, while Raymond was one day under
the age of eighteen.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 106-10.
155. See Kelman, supra note 89, at 599 & n.16 (explaining that rules "will inevitably be
both over- and underinclusive," including, for example, the use of chronological age to define
the crime of statutory rape).
156. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 734 n.4 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Minors
who become embroiled with the law range from the very young up to those on the brink of
majority. Some of the older minors become fully 'street-wise,' hardened criminals, deserving
no greater consideration than that properly accorded all persons suspected of crime."); Feld,
supra note 21, at 230-31 ("The traditional distinction between 'treatment' as a juvenile and
'punishment' as an adult is based on an arbitrarily drawn line that has no criminological signif-
icance other than its legal consequences .... [C]hildren are constantly maturing; they are not
irresponsible children one day and responsible adults the next, except as a matter of law.");
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40
JUVENILES AND THE DEATH PENALTY
guably renders many juvenile murderers insufficiently culpable to deserve
the death penalty. If age corresponded perfectly to the combination of
relevant factors, then its use as a "bright line" would not be problematic.
Because age is not a "perfect" proxy, however, its use as a "bright line"
necessarily produces ordinal disproportionality, or comparative injustice.
Acknowledging the existence of comparative injustice does not pro-
vide us with a solution to the problem posed by the pending juvenile
death penalty cases. Instead, the foregoing discussion leaves two impor-
tant questions unanswered. The first question is whether the principles
of retributive justice are constitutionally significant under the eighth
amendment, so that the Supreme Court must consider the impact of car-
dinal and ordinal proportionality on its decision in the pending cases. In
section III, I address this question and show that the Court has already
incorporated basic retributive principles, including cardinal and ordinal
proportionality, into its modem-day eighth amendment jurisprudence.
Assuming that the principles of retributive justice are constitution-
ally significant under the eighth amendment, the second question is what
should be done about comparative injustice. That is, does the-mere exist-
ence of comparative injustice under a given capital sentencing system
mandate remedial action, and if so, what kind of remedy is the most
appropriate in terms of retributive justice? In section IV, I explain why,
in at least some capital sentencing contexts, a certain amount of compar-
ative injustice simply must be tolerated, while in other contexts, such as
in the context of the juvenile death penalty, considerations of compara-
tive injustice compel the choice of one sentencing system over another.
III. The Supreme Court, Principles of Retributive Justice, and
Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
In Gregg v. Georgia, 157 the Supreme Court upheld the Georgia death
penalty statute against a facial constitutional challenge, concluding that
the death penalty can be justified in terms of "two principal social pur-
poses: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offend-
ers." In recent years, the Court has largely ignored the deterrence issue,
Note, supra note 20, at 61-64; cf Tribe, Childhood, Suspect Classifications, and Conclusive
Presumptions: Three Linked Riddles, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 8, 10 (1975) ("To assume
that this seven-year-old is unfit to vote, to work, to choose his or her own school, simply
because most persons of like age have certain characteristics is to condemn by association.").
157. 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). In a
companion case to Gregg, Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun
and Rehnquist, agreed that the death penalty can be justified in terms of the twin purposes of
retribution and general deterrence. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 354-55 (1976)
(White, J., dissenting).
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preferring to defer to legislative judgments concerning the controversial
question whether the death penalty deters potential murderers. 158 In-
stead, the Court has relied increasingly on the basic principles of retribu-
tive justice to evaluate whether the death penalty, either in a single case
or in an entire category of cases, constitutes "cruel and unusual punish-
ment" under the eighth amendment. This reliance on retributive princi-
ples, and particularly on the concepts of cardinal and ordinal
proportionality, can be observed in at least three lines of Supreme Court
decisions. These three lines of cases involve the application of certain
punishments to certain classes of defendants, the use of certain kinds of
aggravating factors in sentencing, and the role of discretion in capital
sentencing.
In capital cases like Enmund v. Florida, 159 Tison v. Arizona, 160 and
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 161 as well as in noncapital cases like Solem v.
Helm, 162 the Court has applied the principle that the eighth amendment
requires at least a rough correspondence between "the punishment im-
posed and the defendant's blameworthiness."' 163 Restated, a punishment
must be cardinally proportional to the crime. In Enmund, for instance,
the Court prohibited imposition of the death penalty against nontrig-
german felony-murderers who do not "kill, attempt to kill, or intend that
a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed,"' 164 a standard
the Court modified in Tison. 165 In Thompson, in the course of reversing
the juvenile defendant's death sentence, the plurality stressed the need
for punishment to relate to "the personal culpability of the criminal de-
fendant."' 166 Similarly, in Helm the Court held that even a prison sen-
tence must comport with the dictates of cardinal proportionality,
rejecting the notion that a recidivist could receive life in prison without
possibility of parole for committing a series of nonviolent offenses. 167
158. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)
("The value of capital punishment as a deterrent of crime is a complex factual issue the resolu-
tion of which properly rests with the legislatures, which can evaluate the results of statistical
studies in terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not
available to the courts.").
159. 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982).
160. 107 S. Ct. 1676, 1683 (1987).
161. 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2698 (1988).
162. 463 U.S. 277, 284-90 (1983).
163. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 825 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 797 (majority opinion).
165. Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676, 1688 (1987); see infra text accompanying notes
179-81.
166. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2698 (1988) (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J.)
(quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
167. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983). Interestingly, the Helm Court set forth a
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Coker v. Georgia 168 is perhaps the most noteworthy example of the
Court's use of cardinal proportionality to exclude an entire category of
offenders from eligibility for the death penalty. In Coker, a plurality of
the Court concluded that the death penalty is a disproportionate and
therefore unconstitutional punishment for those who rape, but do not
kill. 1 69 Significantly, the plurality did not even seriously discuss the pos-
sibility that deterrence considerations alone might justify the death pen-
alty for rapists who do not kill. 170 Thus, Coker provides some support
for the proposition that cardinal disproportionality, at least in the special
context of the death penalty, "trumps" all other concerns and is a suffi-
cient basis, standing alone, for invalidating a class of death sentences. 171
The Court has also dealt with the concept of proportionality in a
second line of eighth amendment cases involving not the exclusion of
entire categories of defendants from death penalty eligibility, but rather
individual claims that a particular state relied upon an aggravating cir-
cumstance, statutory or otherwise, that failed to relate to the culpability,
and hence the "just deserts," of the particular defendant. Thus, in God-
frey v. Georgia 172 a plurality of the Court declared that an aggravating
circumstance must be "rational" in order to satisfy the eighth amend-
three-part inquiry to determine whether a particular prison sentence would be cardinally pro-
portional to a particular crime. The first part of the inquiry involved an examination of "the
gravity of the offense and the harshness- of the penalty." Id. at 290-9 1. The second and third
parts of the inquiry involved comparisons between the prison sentence imposed in the particu-
lar case and the sentences imposed "on other criminals in the same jurisdiction" for other
crimes and "for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions," respectively. Id. at 291-
92. The Court's adoption of this three-part framework in Helm illustrates the close relation-
ship, described in the preceding section, between cardinal and ordinal proportionality.
168. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
169. Id. at 598 (plurality opinion) (White, J.). Justice White's opinion in Coker, while
technically only a plurality opinion, should properly be viewed as a majority opinion. See
supra note 33.
170. The plurality referred to deterrence considerations in a single sentence in a footnote.
Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 n. 4.
171. "Because the death sentence is a disproportionate punishment for rape, it is cruel and
unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment even though it may mea-
surably serve the legitimate ends of punishment and therefore is not invalid for its failure to do
so." Id. But see Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797-801 (1982) (apparently treating issue
of defendant's individual culpability, and hence cardinal proportionality of death penalty for
defendant's crime, as merely one "prong" in a two-part analysis of the constitutionality of the
sentence). See generally J. DRESSLER, supra note 120, at 38-40 (discussing inconsistency be-
tween Coker and Enmund analyses).
172. 446 U.S. 420, 433 n.16 (1980) (plurality opinion) (Stewart, J.) ("An interpretation of
[Georgia's 'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman' aggravating circumstance] so
as to include all murders resulting in gruesome scenes would be totall, irrational."). Justice
Stewart's opinion in Godfrey is still another "false" plurality opinion entitled to the weight
normally given a majority opinion. See supra note 33.
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ment. In other words, the aggravating circumstance must serve to nar-
row the class of all murderers and single out those who are to be
executed in a manner that is "principled"'173 and not "arbitrary and
capricious." '174
More recently, in Booth v. Maryland 175 the Court elaborated on the
views expressed in Godfrey, holding that aggravating circumstances must
be tied directly to the culpability of the defendant, and cannot be based
on harm that was caused inadvertently. The Booth Court struck down
Maryland's use of a "victim impact statement" at the sentencing hearing
in capital cases, finding such statements, at least in most cases, "wholly
unrelated to the blameworthiness of a particular defendant."'' 76 The
Court explained that "a defendant's level of culpability depends not on
fortuitous circumstances such as the composition of ... [the] victim's
family, but on circumstances over which he has control."'' 77
The opinions in Godfrey and Booth do not clearly identify whether
the Court used cardinal or ordinal proportionality as the basis for evalu-
ating the justice of the death sentences at issue in the two cases. Indeed,
the use of an aggravating circumstance unrelated to the defendant's cul-
pability implicates both concerns. It treats the defendant differently from
other defendants of equal culpability, thus violating ordinal proportional-
ity, and it also creates a risk that the defendant will receive a cardinally
disproportionate death sentence. Under the standard for evaluating car-
dinal proportionality set forth in Tison v. Arizona, ' 78 however, the death
sentence in the Booth case was probably valid. Therefore, the Booth
173. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 433.
174. Id. at 428 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 n.46 (1976)).
175. 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2532-35 (1987).
176. Id. at 2534.
177. Id. at 2534 n.7 (quoting People v. Levitt, 156 Cal. App. 3d 500, 516, 203 Cal. Rptr.
276, 287 (1984)). There is a great deal of tension between the holdings in Coker and Booth.
The Coker plurality viewed the consequences of a defendant's wrongful conduct, namely, the
question whether or not the rapist's victim dies, as absolutely dispositive of the question of
death-eligibility under the eighth amendment, even though such consequences might be be-
yond the control of the defendant. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (plurality
opinion) (White, J.). For example, no matter how much a particular rapist might wish his
victim to die, and no matter how far he might go to carry out this wish, if the victim does not
die the rapist may not receive a death sentence. This view is inconsistent with the position
taken by the Booth majority, that the consequences of a defendant's wrongful conduct are
relevant to death-eligibility only to the extent the defendant both intends and has control over
the occurrence of such consequences. See Booth, 107 S. Ct. at 2533-34. Booth suggests, in
contrast to Coker, that fortuitous events unrelated to the defendant's intent can have no bear-
ing on eligibility for the death penalty.
178. 107 S. Ct. 1676, 1687-88 (1987).
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Court appears to have relied on ordinal, rather- than cardinal, propor-
tionality to strike down the death sentence in that case.
In Tison, the Court held that a defendant who does not kill, but who
is convicted of murder under the felony-murder doctrine, and who both
acts as a "major participant" in the felony and manifests a "reckless in-
difference to the value of human life," may receive the death penalty
providing all of the other requirements for such a punishment are satis-
fied. 179 The Tison Court, in short, established a culpability "floor" for
purposes of applying the eighth amendment's cardinal proportionality re-
quirement: so long as a defendant is at least a "major participant" in a
felony that results in death, even though the defendant does not actually
kill, and so long as the defendant is at least "reckless" with respect to the
value of human life, and so long as at least one valid statutory aggravat-
ing circumstance is present,180 and so long as no mitigating factors are
present, then the death penalty is a cardinally proportional
punishment. 18'
In light of the culpability "floor" established in Tison, the death sen-
tence in Booth was probably within the broad range of cardinally propor-
tional punishments for the particular crime at issue. In Booth, the
defendant was convicted of committing a premeditated murder in which
he was the actual killer.'8 2 Moreover, Booth was directly responsible,
rather than vicariously responsible as in the case of the Tison brothers,
for the existence of the statutory aggravating circumstance found by the
sentencing jury, namely, the fact that the murder was committed during
the course of a robbery. 183 Finally, it is doubtful that whatever mitigat-
179. d at 1688.
180. In Tison, the aggravating circumstance was that the murders were committed in a
"heinous, cruel and depraved manner" by Gary Tison and Randy Greenawalt. The Court did
not address the question whether the eighth amendment bars the attribution of aggravating
circumstances involving the manner of killing to a defendant who does not actually kill. See
id. at 1682 n.2; id. at 1689 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
181. But see Dressier, The Jurisprudence of Death by Another Accessories and Capital
Punishment, 51 U. COLO. L. REv. 17, 50-56 (1979) (arguing that death penalty is inappropri-
ate, in retributive terms, for accomplices who do not personally "cause" the crime to occur);
see also Dressier, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings ofAccomplice Liability: New Solu-
tions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 134-37 (1985) (discussing death eligibility for
accomplices).
182. John Booth was convicted of the double murder of an elderly couple, Irvin and Rose
Bronstein, but received the death penalty only for the murder of Mr. Bronstein. The jury
found Booth guilty of first-degree murder, based on both premeditation and felony-murder
theories, and also found Booth to be the principal in the first degree with respect to Mr. Bron-
stein's murder. Booth v. State, 306 Md. 172, 182, 507 A.2d 1098, 1103 (1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct.
2529 (1987). The jury found Booth's accomplice, Willie Reid, to be the principal in the first
degree with respect to Mrs. Bronstein's murder. Id at 182 n.1, 507 A.2d at 1103 n.1.
183. Id. at 182, 507 A.2d at 1103.
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ing factors existed in Booth could be more significant than the extremely
disruptive family background of the Tison brothers.1 84
Consequently, the Court's decision in Booth must have stemmed
from the belief that, even among defendants who all "deserve" to die in
terms of cardinal proportionality, a state must nevertheless distribute the
death penalty in a manner that comports with ordinal proportionality.
That is, the state must base the difference in punishment between those
death-eligible murderers who receive the death penalty and those who do
not on a difference in the "just deserts" of the respective murderers. If
the state relies, even in part, on an aggravating circumstance that does
not relate directly to the defendant's culpability, then the death sentence
will be "unjust" in comparison to the punishment in other murder cases
involving defendants of equal desert, and therefore must be invalidated
under the eighth amendment.
The third line of cases in which the Court has incorporated retribu-
tive principles into its eighth amendment jurisprudence is the line of
cases dealing with capital sentencing discretion. The Court has long ac-
knowledged that improper exercises of sentencing discretion can produce
unjust, and unconstitutional, death sentences. The Court's 1972 decision
in Furman v. Georgia, 185 striking down the Georgia death penalty statute
on eighth amendment grounds, was such a case. Although the Furman
Court did not indicate whether the results of unguided sentencing discre-
tion violated cardinal or ordinal proportionality, some of the language in
the opinions, and particularly the references to the administration of the
Georgia death penalty as "arbitrary" and "freakish," seems more consis-
tent with the case-by-case comparative approach that is inherent in the
concept of ordinal proportionality. 86
The Court's decision in McCleskey v. Kemp, 18 7 properly viewed, also
supports the premise that cardinal and ordinal proportionality are essen-
tial components of modem-day eighth amendment jurisprudence. The
defendant in McCleskey, a black man who had received a death sentence
for the murder of a white police officer, challenged the facial constitu-
tionality of the Georgia capital sentencing system on the ground that
killers of whites were more likely to receive death sentences than killers
184. Among the mitigating circumstances considered by the sentencing jury were that the
defendant was a victim of "Child Neglect" and lacked a "Strong Father Image." Id. at 221,
507 A.2d at 1123. The Maryland court also noted that "[tihe jury could properly consider...
that Booth had no remorse and thereby reduce the weight to be given to the mitigating factors
which the jury had found did exist." Id. at 210, 507 A.2d at 1117-18.
185. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
186. Id. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
187. 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987).
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of blacks.188 In that case, the Court recognized that some ordinal dispro-
portionality, or comparative injustice, is inevitable in any sentencing sys-
tem.189  The McCleskey Court, however, did not hold that such
comparative injustice is not an evil. 190 Rather, the Court in effect deter-
mined that none of the available alternative approaches to capital sen-
tencing would be more "just" than the guided discretionary approach
employed in Georgia. 191 Whether or not one agrees with the Court's
assessment of this balance, 192 the McCleskey decision is consistent with
the view that the eighth amendment incorporates the concepts of cardi-
nal and ordinal proportionality.
The Court has also observed that too little sentencing discretion in
capital cases can produce unjust, and unconstitutional, death sentences.
This was the situation in Lockett v. Ohio193 and in Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 194 in which the Court required that a sentencer consider all
potential mitigating evidence offered by the defendant. An absence of
sentencing discretion also motivated the Court in Sumner v. Shuman 195
to reject an attempt by the state of Nevada to create a mandatory death
penalty for the special class of defendants who commit murder while
serving a life term in prison. In sum, cases like Lockett, Eddings, and
Shuman are based on the importance of doing individualized justice, 196
which in turn seems to reflect, as did Furman, the Court's reliance
188. Id at 1763.
189. "Apparent discrepancies in sentencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice
system." Id at 1777.
190. The very fact that the McCleskey Court felt compelled to justify at length the exist-
ence of discretion in capital sentencing, see id at 1777-78, is proof that comparative injustice in
sentencing results was viewed by the Court as an evil. If the Court had taken Professor Mor-
ris' position that anisonomic punishments are not "unjust," see supra note 143, then the Court
would have had no difficulty at all in dismissing McCleskey's claim. See also McCleskey, 107
S. Ct. at 1778 n.36 ("The Baldus study in fact confirms that the Georgia system results in a
reasonable level of proportionality among the class of murderers eligible for the death
penalty.").
191. Id at 1778 ("Where the discretion that is fundamental to our criminal process is
involved, we decline to assume that what is unexplained is invidious."); id. at 1781 ("As we
have stated specifically in the context of capital punishment, the Constitution does not 'plac[e]
totally unrealistic conditions on its use.' ") (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50
(1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
192. What makes McCleskey a hard case is precisely the fact that the ordinal dispropor-
tionaity of Georgia's capital sentencing results was demonstrated in such a convincing fash-
ion. See id. at 1763-64 (describing "sophisticated statistical studies" conducted by David
Baldus of the University of Iowa, and his colleagues); id. at 1766 n.7 (assuming, for purposes
of deciding case, that Baldus study is statistically valid).
193. 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
194. 455 U.S. 104, 111 (1982).
195. 107 S. Ct. 2716, 2726 (1987).
196. See, for example, Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605, in which the Court stated:
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on the case-by-case comparative process for evaluating ordinal
proportionality. 97
In all of these lines of cases, the Court has incorporated principles of
retributive justice, including the concepts of cardinal and ordinal propor-
tionality, into its eighth amendment jurisprudence. Because cardinal and
ordinal proportionality are not theoretically distinct, and because both
kinds of proportionality involve comparative processes, it may not be
possible to determine whether a particular eighth amendment case turns
on cardinal or ordinal proportionality. For the same reasons, however, it
is not important to resolve that issue.
What is important is that the Court views the principles of retribu-
tive justice as constitutionally significant under the eighth amendment.
Given the constitutional significance of these principles, the advocates of
a "bright line" ban on the juvenile death penalty must demonstrate why
such a ban should be adopted, in spite of the fact that such a ban conflicts
with fundamental eighth amendment values.
IV. "Bright Lines" and Rebuttable Presumptions in the
Context of the Juvenile Death Penalty
As argued in sections II and III, the use of chronological age as a
"bright line," for purposes of imposing a ban on the juvenile death pen-
alty, will produce comparative injustice, and such injustice is constitu-
tionally significant under the eighth amendment. In this section, I
discuss how the Court might respond to this comparative injustice in the
pending juvenile death penalty cases. In the course of the discussion, I
explain why, in at least some capital sentencing contexts, a certain
amount of comparative injustice must be tolerated, while in other con-
Given that the imposition of death by public authority is so profoundly different
from all other penalties, we cannot avoid the conclusion that an individualized deci-
sion is essential in capital cases. The need for treating each defendant in a capital
case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual is far more
important than in noncapital cases.
197. The Court's decision in Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 53 (1984), that the eighth
amendment does not require a state court to conduct "comparative proportionality review" as
part of its capital sentencing system, is not inconsistent with the view that ordinal proportion-
ality is an essential component of the Court's eighth amendment jurisprudence. Pulley was a
procedural decision, not a substantive one-the Court declined to order the states to adopt one
particular procedure for enhancing ordinal proportionality, but did not in any way suggest that
the underlying value of comparative justice in capital cases was unimportant under the eighth
amendment. To the extent the Pulley Court failed to find the presence of "occasional [ ]...
aberrational outcomes" constitutionally dispositive, id. at 54, the case simply represents an-
other example of the Court's recognition that no capital sentencing system is perfect. See
supra note 191; infra note 199.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40
JUVENILES AND THE DEATH PENALTY
texts, such as in the context of the juvenile death penalty, considerations
of comparative injustice compel, in retributive terms, the choice of one
sentencing system over another.
It would be a mistake to assume that the existence of comparative
injustice under a particular sentencing system must be viewed as intolera-
ble and must therefore lead to a holding of constitutional invalidity of the
sentencing system in question. 198 In fact, as the Court has recognized on
several occasions, comparative injustice, in either the capital or the non-
capital sentencing context, cannot be eliminated completely. 199 This is a
natural consequence of what has been called the "dilemma of discre-
tion, ' '2°° and might also be called the "paradox of proportionality." Or-
dinal proportionality requires an individualized, discretionary approach
to sentencing, because bright line rules, virtually by definition, treat dis-
similar cases, involving defendants whose crimes differ in terms of either
harm or culpability, in a similar fashion.201 Bright line rules, in other
words, virtually always operate in direct violation of the concept of ordi-
nal proportionality. 20 2 Yet even so-called "guided" sentencing discre-
tion, given inherent human fallibility, necessarily creates a risk that
ordinally, and perhaps even cardinally, disproportionate sentences will be
imposed in at least some cases.20 3
The single exception to the general rule that bright lines violate ordi-
nal proportionality is where a bright line defines a class of defendants all
198. This is precisely the view that prevails among many who advocate the abolition of the
death penalty. These commentators argue that the inevitability of ordinal disproportionality,
or comparative injustice, in the context of a punishment as severe and irreversible as the death
penalty, is a compelling argument for abolition. See, e.g., J. MURPHY, supra note 117, at 237-
44; Radin, supra note 114, at 1155; Tribe, supra note 156, at 26 n.64.
199. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1777 (1987) ("Apoarent disparities in sen-
tencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system."); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862,
884 (1983) ("there can be 'no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases governmental
authority should be used to impose death' ") (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605
(1978) (plurality opinion) (Burger, C.J.)).
200. Radin, supra note 114, at 1148-55.
201. Even von Hirsch, who believes that "presumptive sentences" should be established to
govern most sentencing decisions, agrees that the sentencer must have discretion to deviate
from the "presumptive sentence" in particular cases. A. VON HIRSCH, JUsrICE, supra note
112, at 98-101.
202. The Supreme Court has condemned the comparative injustice produced by "bright
lines" in such capital cases as Sumner v. Shuman, 107 S. Ct. 2716, 2724-25 (1987); Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1978); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 332-34 (1976); and Wood-
son v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976).
203. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 255-56 (1972); A. VON HIRSCH, JUSTICE, supra
note 112, at 101 ("Any scheme-with more discretion or less-will lead to some inequities.
Standards will operate arbitrarily in some instances, just as discretion risks disparities and
bias.").
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of whom justly deserve to be on one side or the other of the line. Thus, it
would not be unjust to use a bright line to impose a mandatory death
penalty if all defendants in the relevant class were more culpable than the
most culpable of the defendants who do not, or cannot, receive the death
penalty. 2°4 Similarly, it would not be unjust to use a bright line to ban
the death penalty for a class of defendants if all defendants in the rele-
vant class were less culpable than the least culpable of the defendants
who can, and do, receive the death penalty. 205 These kinds of perfect
bright lines, however, are relatively rare, and the use of chronological age
for purposes of banning the juvenile death penalty does not involve such
a perfect bright line. 20 6
Although the Supreme Court cannot avoid the paradox of propor-
tionality in the juvenile death penalty cases, the Court can deal with the
paradox. In particular, the Court can resolve disputes about the relative
"justice" of different sentencing systems, as in the juvenile death penalty
cases, by following a three-step process. First, the Court should identify
the magnitude of the risk of improper exercises of sentencing discretion.
If this risk is relatively insignificant, then a bright line rule, which by its
very nature treats at least some unlike cases alike, probably would pro-
duce more injustice than a guided discretionary sentencing system. Sec-
ond, if the risk of improper exercises of sentencing discretion is
significant, the Court should look for feasible ways to reduce the risk
while preserving at least some discretion. 20 7 Third, if there is no feasible
way to reduce a proven, significant risk of improper exercises of sentenc-
ing discretion, the Court should balance the injustice created by the
guided discretionary sentencing system against the injustice that would
be created by the adoption of a bright line rule, taking into account the
204. In Sumner, 107 S. Ct. at 2724, the Court was faced with a Nevada statute that im-
posed a mandatory death penalty for those who committed murder while in prison serving a
sentence of life imprisonment without parole. The Court discussed at length the retributive
justice of such a sentencing system and concluded that the bright line drawn by the Nevada
statute did not "perfectly" reflect the relevant factors. Id. at 2724-25 ("These two elements of
capital murder do not provide an adequate basis on which to determine whether the death
sentence is the appropriate sanction in any particular case."); id. at 2725 ("Not only do the two
elements that are incorporated in the mandatory statute serve as incomplete indicators of the
circumstances surrounding the murder and of the defendant's criminal record, but they say
nothing of the [possible mitigating circumstances].").
205. Some such "perfect" bright lines already exist in the context of death penalty law.
See infra notes 226-37 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
207. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1781 (1987) ("As we have stated specifi-
cally in the context of capital punishment, the Constitution does not 'plac[e] totally unrealistic
conditions on its use.' ") (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50 (1976) (joint opin-
ion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
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relative strength of the interests at stake.208 Only ,f on balance, the
bright line rule would produce less injustice than a guided discretionary
approach can such a rule be an appropriate choice in retributive terms. 2°9
Applying this three-step process to the juvenile death penalty cases
leads to the conclusion that the principles of retributive justice compel
the Supreme Court to reject the proposed bright line ban on the juvenile
death penalty. In fact, the juvenile death penalty cases represent such
poor candidates for line-drawing that the Court may not even need to
reach the third step of the process.
The first step of the process requires an inquiry into whether there is
a significant risk of the improper exercise of sentencing discretion in capi-
tal cases involving juvenile murderers. Certainly some risk exists, as it
does in all sentencing systems based on exercises of discretion by fallible
human beings. Is this risk, however, significant?
Although advocates of a ban on the juvenile death penalty assert
that the risk of ordinally or cardinally disproportionate death sentences
is significant,210 they do not present any empirical evidence to support
their assertion. In this way, the juvenile death penalty cases are very
different from the situation the Supreme Court faced in McCleskey. 211 In
McCleskey, the challenge to Georgia's guided discretionary capital sen-
tencing system was supported by persuasive empirical evidence that the
system produced significant ordinal disproportionality. 212 Even in the
face of such evidence, the Court ultimately concluded that no better al-
ternative was available.213
In the juvenile death penalty cases, however, the. underlying asser-
tion that the current guided discretionary capital sentencing system pro-
duces injustice remains unproven. 214 Without proof of this assertion, the
Supreme Court may well find the resolution of the juvenile death penalty
208. See Hertz & Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty of Death Lockett v. Ohio and the
Capital Defendant's Right to Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CALIF. L. REV.
317, 376 (1981).
209. See A. VON HIRSCH, JUSTICE, supra note 112, at 101 ("The most one can do is find a
reasonable mix-to allow some degree of discretion structured by standards.").
210. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2689-99 (1988) (plurality opinion)
(Stevens, J.) (arguing that juveniles are insufficiently culpable to deserve the death penalty); V.
STREIB, supra note 2, at 38 (arguing that selection of juveniles to receive the death penalty is
"arbitrary" and "capricious").
211. 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987); see supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
212. 107 S. Ct. at 1763-64 (discussing "sophisticated statistical studies" conducted by
David Baldus of the University of Iowa and colleagues); id. at 1766 n.7 (accepting, for pur-
poses of deciding case, statistical validity of Baldus study).
213. Id. at 1781.
214. None of the opinions in the Thompson case, for example, contained any substantive
January 1989]
cases, in retributive terms, relatively simple: Why adopt a bright line
rule that will inevitably produce ordinal disproportionality, or compara-
tive injustice, in the absence of proof that the current sentencing system
produces significant injustice?
Moreover, even if the assertion about the risk of unjust death
sentences for juveniles under the current sentencing system is valid, this
is not sufficient to establish the retributive case for a bright line prohibi-
tion of the juvenile death penalty. Instead, under step two of the afore-
mentioned three-step process, the question becomes whether there are
any feasible alternatives to a bright line approach that can significantly
reduce the risk of improper exercises of sentencing discretion, without
eliminating completely the discretion that is so essential to individualized
justice and ordinal proportionality.
The dissenters in Thompson v. Oklahoma215 suggested just such a
compromise between the extremes of too much sentencing discretion and
too little, although they did not appear to rest their suggestion on retribu-
tive principles. As Justice Scalia wrote at the beginning of his dissenting
opinion: "I might even agree with the plurality's conclusion if the ques-
tion were whether a person under 16 when he commits a crime can be
deprived of the benefit of a rebuttable presumption that he is not mature
and responsible enough to be punished as an adult. '216
empirical evidence concerning either the cardinal or ordinal proportionality of death sentenc-
ing decisions in cases involving juvenile murderers.
The assertion about disproportionate results in juvenile cases may actually be counter-
intuitive. Sentencers in capital cases involving juvenile murderers may well be even more
likely than sentencers in other capital cases to take their sentencing responsibilities seriously.
Thus, it may well be true that, under the current guided discretionary capital sentencing sys-
tem, only the very worst of juvenile murderers will actually receive the death penalty. See
Note, The Decency of Capital Punishment for Minors: Contemporary Standards and the Dig-
nity of Juveniles, 61 IND. L.J. 757, 781 (1986) (authored by Lawrence A. Vanore). Unfortu-
nately, in the absence of empirical study of this issue, such intuitive judgments are all we have
to rely upon.
One might reasonably ask whether, as a theoretical matter, the challengers or the defend-
ers of the current capital sentencing system should bear the burden of producing this kind of
empirical information. Given the Supreme Court's rejection of recent facial constitutional
challenges to capital punishment, however, it is clear that, from a practical standpoint, the
challengers bear this burden. The legislative judgments that underlie the choice of a guided
discretionary system will be presumed valid unless, and until, the challengers can demonstrate
otherwise. Cf Markman & Cassell, supra note 151, at 146-47 (arguing that those who seek to
change existing death penalty law on the basis of the risk of executing innocent persons "bear
the burden of ... producing credible evidence" that such risk is significant).
215. 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2715 (1988).
216. Id. at 2712 (Scalia, J., dissenting). A colleague of the author, Alexander Tanford, has
suggested that a better way to improve exercises of sentencing discretion in capital cases in-
volving juvenile murderers would be to increase the size of the jury by one member for every
month the juvenile murderer is under the age of 18, while requiring a unanimous verdict in
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Should the Court become convinced that juvenile murderers are at
risk of receiving an unjust death sentence, due to improper exercises of
sentencing discretion, then the Court should follow Justice Scalia's sug-
gestion and adopt one or more presumptions with respect to the age of
the murderer in capital cases. In Stanford v. Kentucky,217 for example, a
case involving a seventeen-year-old murderer, the Court could hold that
murderers who are below the age of eighteen must be presumed to lack
sufficient maturity to receive the death penalty. This presumption would
be subject to rebuttal by the state, in which case the unusually mature
seventeen-year-old murderer could receive the death penalty. 218 Beyond
the age of eighteen, the law would operate as it already does: immaturity
or lack of culpability, as evidenced indirectly by the murderer's youth,
can be presented as a factor in mitigation of punishment, to be weighed
by the sentencer without benefit of a presumption one way or the
other.21 9
Similarly, in Wilkins v. Missouri, 220 a case involving a sixteen-year-
old murderer, the Court could adopt a rebuttable presumption with re-
spect to murderers who are below the age of seventeen. Should the Court
feel that sixteen-year-old murderers warrant more special treatment, the
presumption could incorporate a heightened standard of proof. This
heightened standard of proof could require the state to prove the unusual
maturity of a particular sixteen-year-old murderer by "clear and con-
vincing evidence, '221 or even "beyond a reasonable doubt. '222
If the Supreme Court decides that the capital sentencing system for
order to impose a death sentence. Cf. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 229-44 (1978) (discuss-
ing constitutionality of use of six-member juries in criminal cases). See generally R. HASTIE, S.
PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 32-36 (1983) (discussing effect of varying size
of jury).
217. Stanford v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 781 (Ky. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. Stan-
ford v. Kentucky, 57 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1988) (No. 87-5765), as amended, 57
U.S.L.W. 3280 (U.S. Oct. 18, 1988) (No. 87-5765).
218. On the effect of such presumptions in the criminal law generally, see Allen, Structur-
ing Jury Decisionmaking in Criminal Cases: 4 Unified Constitutional Approach to Evidentiary
Devices, 94 HARV. L. REV. 321, 332-38 (1980); Jeffries & Stephan, De/nses, Presumptions, and
the Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE LJ. 1325, 1387-97 (1979).
219. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (Burger, C.J.).
220. State v. Wilkins, 736 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. Wilkins v. Mis-
souri, 56 U.S.L.W. 3894 (U.S. June 30, 1988) (No. 87-6026).
221. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979) (requiring at least clear and con-
vincing evidence for an indefinite civil commitment).
222. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979) (requiring proof beyond a reason-
able doubt for each element of a criminal offense); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)
(arguing that the reasonable doubt standard is necessary in the application of the "moral force
of the criminal law"). See generally Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The
juveniles needs to be improved, a presumption-based system would be the
best way to accomplish this improvement.2 23 A pair of constitutional
rulings in the juvenile death penalty cases that establish rebuttable pre-
sumptions, rather than bright lines, would provide greater guidance to
the sentencer than the current guided discretionary system, and would
thereby tend to reduce the risk of improper exercises of sentencing dis-
cretion.224 At the same time, a pair of rulings based on rebuttable pre-
sumptions would preserve some sentencing discretion and thereby avoid
the serious comparative justice consequences of a bright line rule. In the
final analysis, a presumption-based system would help to achieve
ordinally proportional sentencing results, or results that depend on the
"personal culpability of the criminal defendant" 225 rather than on irrele-
vant or only partially relevant factors like chronological age.
V. Line-Drawing and the Death Penalty
There are several areas within the context of death penalty law in
which the Supreme Court has approved the use of a bright line rule.
These areas, however, differ fundamentally from the context of the juve-
nile death penalty. Previously, whenever line-drawing has been approved
by the Court in a capital case, the bright line has been drawn carefully so
as to correspond perfectly with the very characteristics that made impo-
sition of the death penalty "unjust" in the particular case. These perfect
bright lines do not implicate comparative justice concerns in the same
way that the proposed bright line ban on the juvenile death penalty does.
A. Line-Drawing in Mitigation of Punishment: Acceptable "Bright Lines"
and Imperfect "Proxies"
In 1977, just one year after the constitutional resuscitation of the
death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia, 226 the Supreme Court was faced with
the question whether it is constitutional to impose the death penalty
against a defendant who commits rape, but does not kill. In Coker v.
Value of Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1192-99 (1979) (examining the concept of rea-
sonable doubt in the context of criminal adjudications).
223. Cf Tribe, supra note 156, at 31-35 (discussing use of rebuttable presumptions in other
contexts including age distinctions).
224. For general discussions of the efficacy of various kinds of jury instructions, including
presumptions and instructions about evidentiary standards, see A. ELWORK, B. SALES & J.
ALFINI, MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE (1982); Wissler & Saks, On the
Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on
Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37 (1985).
225. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
226. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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Georgia,227 a plurality of the Court concluded that the answer to this
question is no. The Coker plurality drew a bright line: the eighth
amendment bars the death penalty for rape.
Five years later, in Enmund v. Florida,228 the Court faced an issue
similar to the one presented in Coker. In Enmund, the question was
whether it is constitutional to impose the death penalty against a felony-
murderer who did not "kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take
place or that lethal force will be employed. ' 229 The Court, by a five to
four vote, held that the answer is no.230 Again, the Court drew a bright
line: the eighth amendment bars the death penalty for felony-murderers
who do not kill, absent a heightened form of culpability or mens rea
In 1987, the Court revisited the Enmund issue. In Tison v. Ari-
zona,231 a different five-member majority of the Court held that the En-
mund line had been misdrawn. Instead of limiting the death penalty to
intentional felony-murderers, the Tison Court held that the eighth
amendment requires only major participation in the underlying felony
plus a state of mind the Court described as "reckless indifference to the
value of human life."'232 Thus, while the Tison Court enlarged the group
eligible for the death penalty, it did so by moving the Enmund bright
line.
Finally, in Ford v. Wainwright233 the Court faced the question
whether it is constitutional to execute a defendant who is sane at the time
of the crime and the trial, but insane at the time of execution. The Court,
after noting that no state permits such an execution as a matter of state
law, held that the answer to the constitutional question is no.234 Once
more the Court drew a bright line: the eighth amendment bars execution
of those who are insane at the time of execution.
In Coker, Enmund, Tison, and Ford, the Court drew bright lines and
said, in effect: "No defendant who is on the other side of this line may be
put to death." These bright lines were justifiable because in each case the
bright line defined a class of defendants none of whom could be said, in
retributive terms, to deserve to receive the death penalty, or to be exe-
cuted, for their crimes. 235 To put it another way, in each of the afore-
227. 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (plurality opinion) (White, J.).
228. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
229. Id. at 797.
230. Id. at 801.
231. 107 S. Ct. 1676, 1678 (1987).
232. Id. at 1685.
233. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
234. Id. at 408-10.
235. As the Coker plurality put it:
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mentioned cases, the Court drew a bright line that corresponded
precisely to the very characteristics that made the death penalty inappro-
priate, in retributive terms, for the class of relevant defendants.
The four cases, in other words, involved so-called "perfect" line-
drawing. In Coker, for example, it was the very fact that the defendants
had not killed their respective victims when they raped them that made
the death penalty unjust. In Enmund and in Tison, it was precisely the
defendant's relative lack of culpability with respect to the victim's death
that made the death penalty unjust. The fourth case, Ford v. Wain-
wright,236 also involved a precise "fit" between the Court's bright line
and the principles of retributive justice, although it might not appear to
do so at first glance. In Ford, Justice Powell's crucial separate opinion
provided the special definition of "insanity," for eighth amendment pur-
poses, that caused the Court's bright line based on insanity to correspond
precisely to the very characteristics that make execution of the "insane"
necessarily unjust. As Justice Powell explained:
[O]ne of the death penalty's critical justifications, its retributive force,
depends on the defendant's awareness of the penalty's existence and
purpose.... Accordingly, I would hold that the Eighth Amendment
forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the punishment
they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it.237
The juvenile death penalty issue differs fundamentally from the
kinds of issues raised in Coker, Enmund, Tison, and Ford. In the juvenile
death penalty context, chronological age is not the very characteristic
that renders the death penalty necessarily inappropriate, in retributive
terms, for the entire class of relevant defendants. Instead, age is only a
"proxy," and an imperfect one at that, for a combination of factors that
renders the death penalty an unjust punishment for some juvenile mur-
Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral
depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with
murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life. Although it may be
accompanied by another crime, rape by definition does not include the death of or
even the serious injury to another person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more
than that, does not.... We have the abiding conviction that the death penalty... is
an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life.
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (plurality opinion) (White, J.). The Enmund
Court said much the same thing: "Enmund did not kill or intend to kill and thus his culpabil-
ity is plainly different from that of the robbers who killed; yet the State treated them alike and
attributed to Enmund the culpability of those who killed the [victims]. This was impermissible
under the Eighth Amendment." Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982). Likewise, the
Ford Court wrote, "[W]e may seriously question the retributive value of executing a person
who has no comprehension of why he has been singled out and stripped of his fundamental
right to life." 477 U.S. 399, 409 (1986).
236. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
237. Id. at 421-22 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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derers. These factors, noted previously, include immaturity, poor judg-
ment, lack of responsibility, and inability to evaluate carefully the
possible consequences of one's conduct.2 38
Age is an imperfect proxy because, as even the advocates of a bright
line admit, not all juveniles fit the model of the immature, easily influ-
enced "child" who may not, in retributive terms, deserve the death pen-
alty. For example, the Thompson plurality wrote of the issue in
decidedly qualified terms:
[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of
life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psycho-
logical damage. Our history is replete with laws and judicial recogni-
tion that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less
mature and responsible than adults. Particularly "during the forma-
tive years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experi-
ence, perspective, and judgment" expected of adults.239
Because chronological age is only an imperfect proxy for the combi-
nation of factors truly relevant to a juvenile murderer's culpability, it is
clear that at least some members of the class of juvenile murderers do not
properly, as a matter of "just deserts," belong on the "death-ineligible"
side of the line. This is particularly true as one approaches the presump-
tively "mature" age of eighteen. 24 Thus, to the extent that age fails to
reflect accurately the combination of factors that is truly relevant to the
retributive justice of imposing the death penalty, a bright line based on
age will produce ordinal disproportionality and comparative injustice.
During the modem death penalty era, the Supreme Court has never
accepted the argument that the eighth amendment bars the death penalty
for'any particular class of defendants defined solely in terms of an imper-
fect-proxy bright line. When the defendants in the juvenile death penalty
cases request the adoption of such an imperfect bright line, based on
chronological age, they ask the Court to take an unprecedented step in
the modem-day jurisprudence of the eighth amendment.
B. Line-Drawing in Aggravation of Punishment: The Use of Overinclusive
and Underinclusive "Bright Lines"
As described above, the Supreme Court has never upheld a bright
line ban on the death penalty unless such a ban perfectly described the
very characteristics that made the death penalty inappropriate, in retrib-
238. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2698-99 (1988) (plurality opinion) (Stevens,
.).
239. Id at 2698 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982) (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979))).
240. See supra note 156.
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utive terms, for the entire relevant class of defendants. Arguably, how-
ever, the Court has approved "imperfect" line-drawing by mandating the
use of aggravating circumstances. That is, the states arguably use imper-
fect bright lines each time they create a class of death-eligible defendants.
For example, not all murderers who kill in the course of committing
another felony are so culpable as to deserve the death penalty. Yet, in
the majority of death penalty jurisdictions, a murder committed in the
course of another felony renders the defendant eligible for the death pen-
alty.241 A similar point can be made about such aggravating circum-
stances as killing for pecuniary gain242 and killing while lying in wait.243
241. Twenty-five death penalty jurisdictions include the commission of murder in the
course of committing a separate felony of violence within their statutory lists of aggravating
circumstances that can render a defendant eligible for a death sentence. See ALA. CODE
§ 13A-5-49(4) (Supp. 1988); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17) (West 1988); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 16-11-103(6)(g) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(h)(1) (West 1985); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(j) (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(d) (West Supp.
1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(2) (Harrison 1983); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(g)(7)
(Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(b)(6) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)(1) (Bums Supp. 1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(a)(2)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(a) (West Supp.
1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d)(10) (1987); MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5)(d)
(Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.2(11) (Vernon Supp. 1988); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 200.033(4) (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 11-3(c)(4)(g) (West Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-20A-5(B) (1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(5) (1983); OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 2929.04(A)(7) (Anderson 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(i)(7) (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(l)(d)
(Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.020(9) (Supp. 1988); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(h)(iv)
(1988). One additional jurisdiction, Pennsylvania, treats the commission of murder in the
course of committing any felony as an aggravating circumstance. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 9711(d)(6) (Purdon Supp. 1988). Two additional jurisdictions, Texas and Virginia,
that do not use aggravating circumstances nevertheless include murder in the course of com-
mitting certain violent felonies within their substantive definitions of capital murder. See TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon Supp. 1989); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 19.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(d) (1988).
242. Thirty-two jurisdictions include murder for hire or murder for pecuniary gain within
their statutory lists of aggravating circumstances. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49(6) (Supp.
1987); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(5) (Supp. 1987); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 510-101(6)
(1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(1) (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(6)(h)
(1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(h)(6) (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 4209(e)(1)(o) (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(f) (West Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 27-2534.1(b)(4) (Harrison 1983); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(g)(4) (Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(b)(5) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)(4)
(Burns Supp. 1988); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(a)(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp.
1988); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(e) (West Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 413(d)(6) (1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5)(f) (Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 565.032.2(4) (Vernon Supp. 1988); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(l)(c) (1985); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 200.033(6) (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(II)(a)(6) (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN.
2C:1 1-3(c)(4)(d) (West Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-5(F) (1987); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(6) (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(2) (Anderson 1987);
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It might be argued that the use of these "overinclusive" aggravating cir-
cumstances creates comparative injustice, just as would the adoption of a
mitigating bright line in the juvenile death penalty cases.
A closer look, however, reveals that such "overinclusive" aggravat-
ing circumstances are not, in fact, analogous to mandatory mitigating
factors that serve to bar imposition of the death penalty. Unlike the
mandatory mitigating factors in Coker, Enmund, Tison, and Ford, and
unlike the proposed age limit in the juvenile death penalty cases, aggra-
vating circumstances are merely permissive. By definition, aggravating
circumstances merely place a defendant within the class of death-eligible
defendants who will be subjected to the discretion of the sentencer. The
sentencer need not impose the death penalty on the death-eligible defend-
ant. Thus, in theory, the problem of overinclusiveness in the legislative
line-drawing represented by the statutory list of aggravating circum-
stances can be corrected by appropriate exercises of sentencing discre-
tion.244 Moreover, whenever a state has attempted to use an aggravating
circumstance as a mandatory, rather than a permissive, factor in impos-
ing the death penalty, the Supreme Court has held that such a
mandatory factor violates the eighth amendment. 245
Even if a state's list of aggravating circumstances is not overinclu-
sive, another possible source of injustice remains. A state's list of aggra-
vating circumstances may be underinclusive. For instance, a state's
death penalty statute may fail to provide for some class of murderers
who are, in reality, more culpable than those murderers who are statuto-
rily eligible for the death penalty. This arguably might create a problem
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(3) (West 1983); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(2)
(Purdon Supp. 1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-1(3) (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(i)(4) (1982);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(f), (1)(g) (Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.020(4)
(Supp. 1988); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(h)(vi) (1988). Two additional jurisdictions, Texas and
Virginia, that do not use aggravating circumstances nevertheless include murder for hire or
murder for pecuniary gain within their substantive definitions of capital murder. See TEx.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon Supp. 1989); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 19.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(b) (1988).
243. Four jurisdictions include murder by lying in wait within their statutory lists of ag-
gravating circumstances. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(15) (West 1988); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 16-11-103(6)(f) (1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)(3) (Bums Supp. 1988);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303(4) (1987).
244. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct 1756, 1777 (1987) ("it is the jury's function to
make the difficult and uniquely human judgments that defy codification and that 'buil[d] dis-
cretion, equity, and flexibility into a legal system' ") (quoting H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE
AMERICAN JURY 498 (1966)).
245. See Sumner v. Shuman, 107 S. Ct. 2716, 2723 (1987); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
325, 335-36 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976).
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of ordinal disproportionality just as serious as the problem created by
using chronological age as a bright line barring imposition of the death
penalty.
Perhaps surprisingly, it appears that most states have largely
avoided the problem of underinclusiveness in their statutory lists of ag-
gravating circumstances, through the use of broad, descriptive qualifying
terms. Of the thirty-six states with valid death penalty statutes, 2 46
twenty-two include within their lists of aggravating circumstances the
fact that the murder was especially "heinous," "atrocious," "cruel,"
"outrageously or wantonly vile," "horrible," "inhuman," "exceptionally
brutal," or involved "depravity of mind. ' 247 Two states do not use ag-
gravating circumstances as such, but instead use their substantive defini-
tions of capital murder to identify the class of murderers eligible for the
death penalty. 248 One of those states also includes within its statutory
scheme a factor similar to the so-called "wanton, vile, and heinous" ag-
gravating circumstance.249
These "catch-all" aggravating circumstances help reduce, although
perhaps not eliminate, the problem of underinclusiveness by permitting
246. The 36 death penalty jurisdictions are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colo-
rado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. See Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2695 n.26 & 2696 n.30 (1988) (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J.)
(compiling and listing all 36 death penalty statutes). Vermont has a death penalty statute, but
the statute has never been amended to conform to the Supreme Court's decision in Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and is hence constitutionally invalid. See Thompson, 108 S. Ct.
at 2695 n.29. Massachusetts also has a death penalty statute, but it has been declared invalid
under the state constitution. Id. at 2694 n.25.
247. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49(8) (Supp. 1987); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(6)
(West Supp. 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(14) (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-
11-103(6)6) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(h)(4) (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(1) (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(h) (West Supp. 1988); GA. CODE
ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(7) (Harrison 1983); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(g)(5) (Supp. 1986); LA.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(g) (West Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-
101(5)(h) (Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.2(7) (Vernon Supp. 1988); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-2523(1)(d) (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033(8) (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 630:5(II)(a)(7) (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(4)(c) (West Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(9) (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(4) (West 1983); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-l(6) (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(i)(5) (1982);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(q) (Supp. 1986); WYO. STAT. § 6-2-102(h)(vii) (1988).
248. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon Supp. 1989); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 19.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (1988).
249. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (1988) (directing sentencer to consider whether
"conduct in committing the offense for which [defendant] stands charged was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggra-
vated battery to the victim").
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the state to treat as death-eligible those defendants who commit particu-
larly heinous murders that do not happen to fall within one of the more
specific aggravating categories. The fact that only thirteen out of the
thirty-six jurisdictions with valid death penalty statutes omit such a
"catch-all" factor is some evidence of a legislative belief that such a fac-
tor is essential to a truly "fair" or "just" death penalty system.250
Moreover, even in the states that do not include an explicit "catch-
all" aggravating circumstance, it would be wrong to assume that the stat-
utes are seriously underinclusive. Even if a state identifies only a small
number of aggravating factors, and fails to include a "catch-all" factor, it
is at least possible that the state's list includes all of the factors that make
certain murders the "worst" of all murders. And there is some evidence
of a legislative effort to remedy the problem of underinclusiveness. In
Indiana, for example, recent amendments have increased the statutory
list of aggravating circumstances to twelve factors,251 while in Maryland
the list now includes ten factors, some with several subsections. 252
To the extent that a state's death penalty statute is underinclusive,
the statute is vulnerable to criticism on the basis of ordinal dispropor-
tionality. Whether such disproportionality is enough to support an
eighth amendment challenge to the statute is less certain. A legislature is
empowered to consider a wider range of concerns than is appropriate for
the Supreme Court, whose role is limited to interpreting the Constitu-
tion. 25 3 As noted previously, the Court has largely confined itself, in the
death penalty area, to resolving retributive justice issues.254 A legislature
may have greater leeway than the Court in relying upon other values.
For example, a legislature could perhaps justify excluding from death-
eligibility murderers who use poison, on the view that such murders are
so rare in the particular state that they need not trigger the unique deter-
rent of the death penalty, despite the comparative injustice such an exclu-
250. But see Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance in Capital
Cases--The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C.L. REv. 941, 943-45 (1986) (criticizing use of
"catch-all" factors in capital sentencing).
251. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)(1)-(b)(12) (Burns Supp. 1988).
252. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d)(l)-(d)(10) (1987).
253. It is the legislatures, the elected representatives of the people, that are "consti-
tuted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people."
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. [238, 383 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)]. Legisla-
tures also are better qualified to weigh and "evaluate the results of statistical studies
in terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not
available to the courts," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. [153, 186 (1976) (joint opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).]
McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1781 (1987).
254. See supra notes 157-97 and accompanying text.
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sion might produce.2 55
In any event, whether underinclusive death penalty statutes are un-
constitutional or merely unjust, the existence of such statutes does not
justify creating additional injustice through the adoption of an imperfect
bright line on the mitigation side. Instead, before the Court adopts such
a bright line as a matter of constitutional law, advocates of a "bright
line" must demonstrate why its benefits will outweigh the comparative
injustice that will result from its adoption.
VI. Line-Drawing and Age in Other Contexts
Bright lines based on age appear throughout the law in such areas as
voting, driving, gambling, marriage, and military and jury service. Natu-
rally, questions arise as to whether these other age-based bright lines cre-
ate similar serious problems of comparative injustice. In this section, I
demonstrate that although other age-based bright lines exist, the
problems of comparative injustice in such other contexts are far less seri-
ous than in the death penalty context.
There are at least four important reasons why these other kinds of
bright lines based on chronological age are different from the kind of
bright line proposed in the juvenile death penalty cases. First, punish-
ment issues, unlike other issues involving the distribution of governmen-
tal benefits or burdens, involve the placing of blame, and therefore
implicate comparative justice considerations to a much greater extent
than do other issues. As Andrew von Hirsch has explained:
Punishment is different from economic goods, taxes, or other govern-
ment-generated benefits or burdens. The difference is that it has cen-
sure as part of its defining characteristics. In an institution which thus
involves praising or blaming, the requirement of equal treatment be-
comes much stronger. Unequal treatment would imply that the recipi-
ents are of unequal praiseworthiness or blameworthiness. 256
Von Hirsch offers the example of competing for a grant and competing
255. "[D]eterminations of appropriate sentencing considerations are 'peculiarly questions
of legislative policy.'" Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2539 (1987) (White, J., dissenting)
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.)). Similarly, in the context of the juvenile death penalty, a legislature, unlike the
Supreme Court, may well have broader power to act. For example, it might decide that as a
matter of public policy, it would be a good idea to send a "symbolic message" about the special
value of the lives of young people. To accomplish this, it might enact a bright line ban on the
juvenile death penalty. By acting in this way, a legislature has made a judgment that the value
of such a "symbolic message" outweighs the retributive justice concerns implicated by such a
ban.
256. Von Hirsch, supra note 143, at 27.
[Vol. 40
JUVENILES AND THE DEATH PENALTY
for a prize.257 With a grant, it might be appropriate for the grantor to
take into account "nonretributive" concerns, such as who can generate
more interest in the project, even when these concerns might result in the
awarding of the grant to the less "worthy" competitor. A prize, on the
other hand, is designed to reward the most "worthy" competitor. There-
fore, it would be unjust to consider who can do more good with the prize
money.
Although von Hirsch's example illustrates the difference between
"benefit" and "praise," the same point can be made with respect to the
difference between "burden" and "blame," or "punishment." Given the
relationship between "praise" or "blame," on the one hand, and "de-
sert," on the other hand, it is much more important to act in conformity
with the concept of ordinal proportionality, or comparative justice, when
the matter involves either praise or blame than when it involves "mere"
governmental benefits or burdens.
The second difference between a ban on the juvenile death penalty
and other kinds of age limits is that, even if one could identify some other
context in which comparative justice mattered just as much as in the
context of punishment, this would not necessarily mean that use of a
bright line based on age would be equally unjust in such a context. Age
is generally used as a "proxy" for some combination of other factors,
such as maturity and good judgment, that are relevant to the issue in
question. Age may simply be a better "proxy" for the relevant combina-
tion of factors in some other context than it is in the context of the juve-
nile death penalty, thus making its use as a proxy more easily justified in
terms of comparative justice.258 For example, age may correspond more
closely with the factors that are relevant to military service, such as phys-
ical maturity, than it does with those factors relevant to culpability for
criminal conduct.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the relative costs and benefits
of using an individualized, case-by-case approach to resolve the issue in
question represents a crucial distinction between the juvenile death pen-
alty context and virtually every other context in which age limits have
been imposed. It would be absurd to suggest that, because some unusu-
ally mature seventeen year olds are treated unjustly by a minimum voting
age of eighteen, we should require an individualized determination of
257. See id at 27-28; see also A. VON HIRSCH, CRIMES, supra note 119, at 41 (comparing
graduate assistantships to fellowships).
258. "Our cases sensibly suggest that constitutional rules relating to the maturity of mi-
nors must be drawn with an eye to the decision for which the maturity is relevant." Thompson
v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2718 n.5 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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every seventeen year old's right to vote. The costs of holding such indi-
vidualized hearings would greatly outweigh whatever injustice might be
produced by the use of a bright line minimum voting age.25 9 The same
point can be made about virtually every other age limit under the law,
such as the minimum ages for driving, gambling, marriage, and military
and jury service.
In the context of the juvenile death penalty, however, the situation is
quite different. First, the number of cases requiring individualized reso-
lution is very small.260 Second, the importance of ensuring "just" results
is very great. 261 These two factors lead to the conclusion that, unlike in
virtually every other context involving bright line age limits, the benefits,
in terms of retributive justice, of requiring an individualized, case-by-case
determination of the maturity of every juvenile murderer facing a death
sentence greatly outweigh the administrative costs of such a case-by-case
approach.
Fourth, and finally, in such contexts as voting, driving, drinking,
gambling, and marriage, there is a "rough" justice in saying to a juvenile,
"I realize that you may be just as mature as an older person, and there-
fore just as qualified to engage in whatever specific behavior is at issue.
The chronological age limit is arbitrary, and operates unjustly in your
particular case. But this is a bright line that you will eventually cross,
just as everyone has who came before you in terms of age. Therefore,
you must wait your turn, and eventually you too will be allowed to vote,
drive, drink, gamble, and marry." Many bright lines based on age,
although justifiable primarily on the basis of administrative efficiency,
nonetheless operate with this kind of rough equality. Such rough equal-
ity may be acceptable, at least where we are less than confident that we
can correctly resolve the issue in question, on a case-by-case basis, with-
out incurring prohibitive costs.
As a general matter, however, a defendant is, and can be, subjected
to the death penalty decision only once. Thus, it does no good to say to
the eighteen year old who receives the death penalty, "I realize the seven-
259. Cf Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-39 (1976) (using similar balance of costs
and benefits to determine whether individualized hearings are required as a matter of constitu-
tional due process).
260. Ironically, this is one of the very arguments made by the plurality in Thompson to
support the adoption of a bright line ban on the juvenile death penalty. See Thompson, 108 S.
Ct. at 2697 (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J.).
261. As the Court has stated, there is a "qualitative difference between death and any
other permissible form of punishment," and this difference leads to "'a corresponding differ-
ence in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in
a specific case.'" Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884-85 (1983) (quoting Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
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teen year old who committed the same crime as you did is as mature as
you are, but he cannot receive the death penalty solely because of his
chronological age. Someday he, too, will be eighteen years old, and he
can then receive the death penalty." The fact is that the seventeen year
old most likely will never be in the same position as the eighteen year old.
Rather, the seventeen year old will serve a life sentence or some other
lengthy prison term, and even if released from prison will probably never
again commit a crime that might subject him to the death penalty.2 62
The rough equality that obtains in such contexts of voting, driving,
drinking, gambling, and marriage is absent in the death penalty context.
For these reasons, the use of age as a bright line in the juvenile death
penalty context is quite different from the use of age to draw bright lines
in other contexts. The analogies to the minimum ages for driving, vot-
ing, gambling, marriage, and military and jury service are inappropriate
and misleading. The nature of punishment generally, and of the death
penalty in particular, should make one particularly wary about the use of
age, or any other "imperfect" proxy, as a bright line.
Conclusion
During the 1988 Term, the Supreme Court will attempt to resolve
the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty. In the pending juve-
nile death penalty cases of High v. Zant, 263 Wilkins v. Missouri,264 and
Stanford v. Kentucky,2 65 the Court will attempt to decide whether the
states may continue to use the current, guided discretionary capital sen-
tencing system for juvenile murderers; whether the eighth amendment
compels instead the adoption of a bright line prohibition of the juvenile
death penalty based on chronological age; or whether a brand new, alter-
native sentencing system for juvenile murderers is constitutionally
required.
The Court may choose to rely on any one of several grounds in de-
ciding the constitutional issue raised in these cases. But if the Court is at
262. "[J]uvenile murderers tend to be model prisoners and have a very low rate of recidi-
vism when released." V. STREIB, supra note 2, at 37; see also Vitiello, Constitutional Safe-
guards for Juvenile Transfer Procedure: The Ten Years Since Kent v. United States, 26 DE
PAUL L. REV. 23, 32-34 (1976) (discussing juveniles' amenability to treatment).
263. High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. High v. Zant, 56
U.S.L.W. 3894 (U.S. June 30, 1988) (No. 87-5666).
264. State v. Wilkins, 736 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. Wilkins v. Mis-
souri, 56 U.S.L.W. 3894 (U.S. June 30, 1988) (No. 87-6026).
265. Stanford v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 781 (Ky. 1987), cert granted sub nom. Stan-
ford v. Kentucky, 57 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1988) (No. 87-5765), as amended, 57
U.S.L.W. 3280 (U.S. Oct. 18, 1988) (No. 87-5765).
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all serious about the suggestion, expressed in death penalty cases like
Coker v. Georgia,266 Enmund v. Florida,267 Tison v. Arizona,268 and Booth
v. Maryland, 269 that retributive justice is the benchmark for deciding the
constitutionality of a challenged aspect of a capital sentencing system,
then the Court's decision in the juvenile death penalty cases should not
be difficult. In view of the perils of line-drawing, the Court should either
retain the current system or adopt a set of rebuttable presumptions based
on age. By so ruling, the Court can preserve the sentencing discretion
that is essential to satisfying the requirement of ordinal proportionality.
There may be good reasons for adopting bright lines in at least some
sentencing contexts. Sometimes bright lines completely remedy
problems of comparative injustice, because they "perfectly" reflect the
very characteristics that render a given sentence unjust for a given class
of offenders and crimes. Additionally, bright lines may represent the best
response to sentencing situations in which an individualized, case-by-case
approach to resolving the relevant issue would be prohibitively costly.
Moreover, bright lines may be a superior alternative to discretionary sen-
tencing systems that produce significant injustice and that cannot be im-
proved in any feasible way.
None of these justifications for a bright line approach to sentencing
exists, however, in the pending juvenile death penalty cases. Conse-
quently, although the "paradox of proportionality" may present the
Court with extremely difficult choices in some death penalty cases, the
appropriate choice is clear in the juvenile death penalty cases.
The principles of retributive justice compel the conclusion that the
Supreme Court should reject the proposed bright line ban on the juvenile
death penalty based on chronological age. Only through retention of the
current guided discretionary approach to capital sentencing of juveniles,
or through some modification which preserves sentencing discretion, can
the ends of retributive justice best be served.
266. 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
267. 458 U.S. 782, 798-801 (1982).
268. 107 S. Ct. 1676, 1683 (1987).
269. 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2533 (1987).
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